

CHAPTER 2

Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries: A Key Requirement for Tailored Deterrence

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Deterrence theory makes assumptions about the nature of the adversary. Explicitly, or more often implicitly, how the adversary reasons and reacts to the prospect of violence as it considers pursuing a particular path is at the heart of deterrence theory. Thus the concept of deterrence is “primarily a psychological phenomenon, involving as it does calculations of the behavioral dispositions of an adversary state. In this sense, a complete understanding of the nation’s security cannot be based solely on estimations of its military capability.”²

Observing that deterrence theory is a sub-set of theories of rational choice, Janice Gross Stein characterizes deterrence as seeking “to prevent undesired action by convincing the party who may be contemplating such action that its cost will exceed any possible gain.” She has emphasized there is no single theory of deterrence.³ In reviewing the literature of deterrence, she observes that the first wave of deterrence theories, by scholars such as Schelling, were for the most part deductive in nature.⁴ It emphasized the credibility of threats and commitments.

As observed by Keith Payne in his trenchant critique of deterrence theory, “the leaders are assumed to be rational and willing to engage in cost-benefit calculations when making policy decisions.”⁵ In her edited book, *Psychological Dimensions of War*, in a chapter on “Dilemmas of Deterrence: Rational and Irrational Perspectives,” Glad has critiqued models of deterrence deriving from game theory, observing that “one assumes a certain rationality in both of the adversaries.”⁶ She then discusses multiple examples of misperceptions of adversary motivations.

But that assumption of rationality, as Keith Payne emphasizes, also assumes shared values and understandings. In his analysis of 20th century history, the political psychologist Ralph White coined the phrase “mirror imaging” to refer to the pre-war period leading up to conflicts, where each

side resembled the other in its aggressiveness and in justifying the primarily defensive motivation of its own aggressiveness. He sees this as war-promoting motivation. He especially emphasizes the role of false attribution of motivations to escalating spirals of conflict.⁷

The underlying assumption of deterrence during the Cold War was indeed the rationality of the adversaries. Surely the Soviet leaders would not be so irrational as to risk assured destruction, strategists in the West reasoned. Surely, the United States leaders would not be so irrational as to risk assured destruction, reasoned the Soviet Union counterparts. Hence, Mutual Assured Destruction, suitably characterized by the acronym MAD, was the governing doctrine. But, proponents of MAD theory will note it worked. Whether the fact there were no nuclear conflicts during the Cold War era was a consequence of MAD doctrine is, however, a dubious, and ultimately improvable, proposition. For leaders are flesh and blood, and fall prey to the gamut of human emotions — pride, over-optimism, fear, insecurity — as the rest of us. And, as emphasized by Graham Allison in his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, *Essence of Decision*, a hazard of the rational national actor level of analysis is it forecloses the ability to incorporate into analysis the impact of bureaucratic politics, what he termed the Organizational Process Model. Nor did it take into account the Governmental Politics Model which reflects the factional strivings and palace politics among leaders striving for influence.⁸

One of the puzzling aspects of the discovery of possible offensive missiles in Cuba by U-2 photography to the Executive Committee, President Kennedy's small advisory group, was the apparent absence of attempts to camouflage the sites under construction. Surely, the reasoning went, if the Soviet Union attempted to install offensive missiles in Cuba to close the missile gap, they would wish to accomplish this by a *fait accompli*. And yet the sites were not camouflaged. Therefore, the reasoning went, perhaps these were not offensive missile sites after all, delaying the conclusion of the gravity of the posed threat.

We now know from a series of meetings with Soviet interlocutors that gaining political-military advantage through a *fait accompli* was indeed the strategic goal of the Soviet politburo. But it turned the implementation of the decision over to the strategic rocket forces, which used the same standard operating procedure in establishing a missile site in Cuba that they had employed in the Warsaw Pact states. This

conclusion required analysis at the level of bureaucratic politics and could not be discerned at the rational national actor level of analysis.

But in fact, organizations don't make decisions, policy-making groups do. Allison depicts the intense interplay among the participants in EXCOMM during the 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis. Three military options were under consideration: a surgical air strike, an invasion of Cuba and a military blockade. Demonstrating the power of analogy and framing, Attorney General Robert Kennedy framed the airstrike on the missile bases as analogous to Pearl Harbor and indicated history would view his brother as the Tojo of the Western world if he carried out this sneak attack. That was enough for JFK, who already had his eye on the history books, to take this quite sensible option off the table. As they were debating between an invasion and a blockade, U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson indicated that it was unwise to push the Soviet into a corner. Since the missiles in Turkey were considered outmoded and needed to be removed anyway, why not offer the Soviets a face-saving way out of the dilemma, and offer to remove U.S. offensive missiles in Turkey in return for the Soviets removing their offensive missiles from Cuba? After raising this suggestion, he excused himself to go to the rest room. After he departed, a hawkish member of the Joint Chiefs made a derisive comment to the effect that Stevenson was a cowardly impotent old man. When he returned from the restroom, his idea had been discarded, and they were debating the merits of the two military options.⁹ This is a classic example of "groupthink" as described by Irving Janis, where the general served as a "mindguard," making an *ad hominem* attack on the messenger, thus keeping his idea out of play.¹⁰ Such a maneuver contributes to the so-called "risky shift" phenomenon, wherein social psychologists have found that groups of individuals can make riskier decisions than those individuals would if making the decisions on their own.¹¹

But in fact, ultimately, groups don't make decisions, people do. And the retrospective analysis conducted by Sherman Kent, the father of national intelligence, of the intelligence failure during the Cuban missile crisis concerning the delay in understanding the gravity of the Soviet threat concluded insufficient attention was paid to the political personalities of the two principal actors, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, who were uncritically assumed to be rational. This is not to say they were viewed as irrational. Rather, the nature of Khrushchev's and

Castro's decision-making, especially their risk-taking propensities, was insufficiently taken into account.

In fact, as Payne emphasizes, had Khrushchev followed the counsel of Castro and Che Gueverra, nuclear conflict might well have occurred with devastating consequences.¹² Payne quotes James Blight who was one of the negotiators in the historic meetings between U.S. and Soviet participants involved in the Cuban missile crisis.¹³ Col. Viktor Semykin describes the Cuban leadership's extreme urgings of the Soviets to carry out a missile attack and reported they seemed heedless of the consequences: "The Cubans really insisted we use our weapons. 'Why else did you come here? Use your weapons. Fire.' They were ready for war. Maybe they believed so strongly, they were ready to sacrifice themselves." They would say, 'Cuba will perish, but socialism will win.' They were ready to sacrifice themselves." Che Guevara in particular expressed his willingness to sacrifice himself and Cuba for the cause of socialism. "If the rockets had remained, we would have used them all and directed them against the heart of the United States, including New York, in our fight against aggression." This "ultimate showdown" with the United States, in his view, was "the final aim of Communism."¹⁴

Reflecting a cooler disposition, and, as Payne notes, "a cost-benefit calculus more susceptible to deterrence threats," Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan is quoted as replying, "We see your readiness to die beautifully, but we believe that it isn't worth dying beautifully." Khrushchev himself was to remark later, "At that time he [Castro] was a very hot-tempered person.... He failed to think through the obvious consequences of a proposal that placed the planet on the brink of extinction."¹⁵

In discussions with Allison, I have observed that a fourth level of analysis is called for in that while his Governmental Politics Model does take individuals into account, it does so in the capacity as individuals, as rational actors, and as black boxes striving to maximize their interests. At this level, the individual is a coolly calculating Machiavellian. But this ignores the passions that drive men's souls. It ignores jealousy, suspiciousness, vengefulness, hubris and the gamut of emotions that drive men's actions. Thus, individual personalities and group dynamics both powerfully influence decisions.

The goal of the above discussion is to cast doubt on the assumption of rationality that governed deterrence theory during the Cold War. Even then, by no means were decisions the consequence of coldly calculated cost-benefit analysis. And if that was the case even then, what of the post-Cold War environment? Surely a requirement for deterrence in the post-Cold War environment is a nuanced understanding of the adversary in his cultural and political context. Optimally, to deter an adversary requires nuanced understanding of the adversary's psychology and decision-making. In his contribution to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict under the leadership of David Hamburg, Alexander George stressed in particular the need for accurate nuanced analysis of the adversary — what he called actor-specific behavioral models — as an indispensable requirement undergirding coercive diplomacy.¹⁶ The report stressed the critical role of leadership both in promoting deadly conflict and in avoiding it.

This suggests that a required answer to the question posed by Elaine Bunn in her 2007 article in the *Strategic Forum*, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” is that *it must be*.¹⁷ Bunn identifies three facets of tailored deterrence: first tailoring to specific actors and specific situations; second tailoring capabilities; and third tailoring communications.¹⁸

The end of the Cold War has been destabilizing, producing not a “peace dividend,” but an unpredictable international climate in which major political crises have been produced by rogue leaders of outlaw nations. The relatively stable and predictable superpower rivalry has been supplanted by a series of regional conflicts often started by the actions of previously unknown or poorly understood leaders. Leaders of trans-national terrorist organizations must be added to the list of dangerous adversaries. There has been a proliferation of destructive power in the hands of nations and trans-national organizations with hostile agendas toward the United States.

There is “no one size fits all” deterrence, and what deters one adversary can be an incitement for another. Recognizing this, the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report*, sets forth a concept of tailored deterrence with three classes of adversaries in mind: advanced military competitors, regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) states, as well as non-state terrorist networks. It is interesting to observe the 2006 date, which is fully 17 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and marked

the end of the Cold War and the super-power rivalry. Yet the cold warrior mentality and attendant-deterrence strategy continued to dominate with a tendency to extrapolate uncritically deterrence theory established during the Cold War to new classes of adversaries. But to tailor deterrence to these new adversaries will in turn require a level of knowledge concerning the adversary which we often do not possess, and that is one of the dilemmas with which Bunn struggles in her essay; namely, we can never possess the degree of knowledge necessary to fully tailor deterrence to the adversary's unique psychology.

However, if we can never possess the full degree of knowledge of our adversaries' psychology, decision-making, and strategic calculus necessary to tailor deterrence with confidence that our policies will be perceived and our communications received in the desired fashion, we certainly can and must improve in our ability to accurately construct actor-specific behavioral models.

One of the first tasks is to define the locus of decision-making. Here the work of Hermann, Hermann and Hagan who have systematically studied how government makes decisions is particularly helpful.¹⁹ They usefully distinguish among three types: first, the predominant leader, where a single individual has the power to make decisions and to stifle opposition; second, single group, a set of interacting individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, who have the ability to select a course of action and obtain compliance; and finally, multiple autonomous groups - the important actors are members of different groups or coalitions, no one of which has the ability by itself to decide or force compliance on the others and, no overarching body exists in which all the necessary parties are members.

Earlier, White had observed that both Hitler and Mussolini were "one-man dictatorships, and also aberrant personalities of an extremely macho and narcissistic if not also paranoid type." Observing that Stalin with his morbid suspicion of the West was also paranoid, he contrasts the Stalin period with the post-Stalin period of the Cold War.²⁰ The former was a leader predominant society, whereas the latter more closely resembled a single-group leadership, which to some degree guarded against a dominant aberrant personality. Within the Politburo, to be sure, the chairman was first among equals, but was indeed constrained by the dynamics of the politburo. Consider, for example, during the Cuban

missile crisis that Khrushchev was compelled to resign after the forced Soviet withdrawal and humiliation in the crisis.

The balance of this chapter will focus on tailoring to specific actors, including trans-national terrorist organizations. The four examples chosen, Iraq, North Korea, Iran and al-Qaeda all were, or are of concern, with reference to weapons of mass destruction. This review of these four actor-specific behavioral models will also consider the importance of such models for coercive diplomacy. Several of the examples chosen will be from leader predominant states and will note the value of communications tailored to split the leader from his inner circle and/or followers.

Saddam Hussein of Iraq: “Saddam is Iraq, Iraq is Saddam”

Iraq under Saddam Hussein surely represents a leader predominant society, as reflected in the aphorism in the sub-head, “Saddam is Iraq; Iraq is Saddam.” In the testimony I presented to the House Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in December 1990, a month before the outbreak of conflict, I summarized a political personality profile of Saddam I had developed after the invasion of Kuwait, depicting him as a malignant narcissist.²¹ Indeed in his own mind, Saddam and Iraq were one and the same. He viewed himself as one of history’s great leaders. He had a paranoid orientation, had no constraint of conscience, and was willing to pursue whatever aggression was necessary in pursuit of his goals.

In contrast to the wide-spread caricatures of Saddam as “the madman of the Middle East,” closer analysis revealed him to be a rational calculator. He nevertheless often miscalculated because of his ethnocentric framework and because he was surrounded by a leadership circle composed of sycophants. For good reasons, they were reluctant to constructively criticize their leader, for to do so would result not only in losing their job, but could also lead to losing their life. Thus Saddam was in touch with reality psychologically, but could be out of touch politically because he was if he were only told what he wanted to hear rather than what he needed to hear.

Having traced a pattern of reversals during his career, Saddam could reverse himself and withdraw from Kuwait, only if he came to

believe that he could do so without losing face and that he would retain his power — a double contingency. But if backed into a corner, he could lash out.

During the 1990-91 confrontation in the Gulf, President George H. W. Bush pounded on the table and said, “There will be no face saving.” Moreover, a U.S. general had leaked contingency plans to remove Saddam. So, neither of the two contingent requirements was met, and Saddam felt no choice but to hunker down and attempt to survive the initial massive air campaign which had been well announced, hoping to engage the coalition in a ground campaign. Saddam believed the U.S. suffered from a Vietnam complex and could not tolerate again the spectacle of America’s youth in body bags, which would lead to public protests. He believed given enough Iraqi resistance political impasse would result followed by a ceasefire. Thus Saddam also calculated he would win while losing by showing he had the courage to stand up to the mightiest military force on earth. Indeed, he held a press conference after five days of the massive air campaign, declaring victory. Since it had been predicted he could only withstand three days of aerial bombardment before crumbling, by holding out for five days he had already “won” and each additional day only further magnified the scope of his victory. The Mother of All Battles Mosque was erected to commemorate his great “victory.” Here the attempt to coerce him with the threat of the massive battle looming failed because it did not take into account his political psychology, in particular, his need to save face and be guaranteed he would remain in power.²²

In the run-up to the second Gulf War, two themes dominated the debate. One concerned administration contentions that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden collaborated. The second involved the requirement to attack preemptively, lest Saddam Hussein provide nuclear weapons to terrorists. But careful analysis of political personalities of the principals would have cast serious doubt on both of these propositions. In the first place, there was considerable evidence that the committed Wahabi Sunni Muslim Osama bin Laden and the secular Saddam Hussein were bitter rivals, seeking support from the same constituency. Moreover, accepting the premise that Saddam was both a prudent decision-maker and risk averse, if he did have weapons of mass destruction, the likelihood he would give them to terrorists so they were out of his control was unlikely

to the extreme, for the terrorists had no fixed address, whereas if the weapons were traced to him, he knew he would be incinerated. At a minimum, the conclusions springing from this level of analysis should have raised enough questions so as to prompt a Team B review.

In the second Gulf war, the administration of President George W. Bush was concerned with the possibility Saddam would use WMD. In the fall of 2002, it made use of tailored communications delivered publicly, in what could be characterized as public diplomacy or information operations. First, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated the Iraqi generals had an important role to play in the reconstruction of their country Iraq. Of course, he went on, if they became involved in weapons of mass destruction, all bets were off. Two weeks later, President Bush indicated President Saddam might order the use of weapons of mass destruction. If he did so, Bush went on, the Iraqi generals would be well advised to disobey those orders. Even though Iraq was clearly a leader predominant society, Saddam nevertheless required the loyalty of his generals. This double-barreled salvo of public diplomacy was designed to drive a wedge between Saddam and the generals and convince them to look out for their own welfare.

In the run-up to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq with intelligence revealing a massive buildup of Iraqi troops on the Kuwait border, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie was instructed to meet with Saddam Hussein. While she has been much criticized, the message she was instructed to deliver carefully avoided the threats of serious consequences should Iraq invade Kuwait. Referring to the massive deployment of troops in the South, she indicated she had received “an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship — not confrontation — regarding your intentions.”²³ Later she continued, “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.” When this became public, it was widely assumed this explicitly non-confrontational language was taken as a go-ahead by Saddam, and in effect reassured him there would be no serious consequences for his planned invasion.

A subsequent profile characterized Saddam as a prudent decision-maker, who indeed was not prone to taking unnecessary risks. It further

emphasized he tended to see the world through Arab eyes and take threatening language as hyperbole. In terms of coercive diplomacy, this emphasizes the importance in delivering an unambiguous demarche of the gravity of the consequences should Saddam proceed with what seemed to be preparation for an invasion of Kuwait.

Had Saddam already determined to go forward at that late hour? Perhaps. But as a prudent decision-maker who had often reversed himself in the service of “revolutionary pragmatism,” Saddam might well have had his attention focused by a clear confrontational demarche in which it was made clear that an invasion of Kuwait would be met with force and avoided the destructive conflict that followed. Instead he took the explicitly non-confrontational language, coupled with statements from the Department of State that there were no security commitments to Kuwait, as reassurance that there would be no negative consequences.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran: Seeking Chaos?

Much of the provocative statements from Iran are from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It was Ahmadinejad on April 10, 2010, who revealed Iran had a centrifuge that would process uranium six times faster than the earlier models. Then on April 19, Iran announced it would build a new uranium enrichment plant, giving emphasis to the memorandum from Secretary of Defense Bob Gates that starkly asserted the U.S. “does not have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear capability.”

Were he a predominant leader in the mode of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, there would be reason to be gravely concerned that Iran, under his leadership, as summarized in the following profile, was undeterrable. But, as Gregory Giles emphasizes in Chapter 5, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” Iran is assuredly not a predominant leader state. Indeed, the national security decision-making is a very complex calculus, with many balancing factions, and the most important leader, Supreme Leader Khamenei, carefully balances out the often contradictory factions. This political personality profile of President Ahmadinejad is presented both as a profile of one of the important leaders,

certainly the most vocal, but most importantly, to emphasize the importance of carefully analyzing the nature of the leadership and its decision-making and the constraints on any single leader.

Ahmadinejad's father, Ahmad Saborjhian, was a business failure, both as a barber and as a grocer. His name, signifying he was in the rug-weaving industry, suggested a peasant background. When he went to Teheran in the construction boom, he changed his name to Ahmadinejad, "from the race of Prophet Muhammad." He sacrificed for his family, whose success would be his.

Young Ahmadinejad was known as an intelligent, diligent and studious child. He was excluded from Koran classes because he was too young, but insisted he could read the Koran and demonstrated such. He was an excellent student, who boasted to his fellow students that he would be in the top 10 nationally in the Concours university exams. (150,000 took the exam). He finished 132, which was in the top 1 percent, but this suggested a special sense of self.

Ahmadinejad started his university studies in civil engineering during the second half of the 1970s, a time of political turmoil in Iran. He was the founder of the Islamic Students Union and was involved in a radical anti-Shah student magazine. He was reportedly a member of the group that planned the takeover of the American embassy in Iran in 1979.²⁴

Despite his cosmopolitan appearance and being at ease before international audiences, there is considerable evidence that Ahmadinejad is ideologically extreme. When Ayatollah Khomeini launched his human wave attacks of children, armed only with pink plastic keys to paradise around their necks, this terrifying tactic turned the corner in Iran-Iraq war. It was, according to some reports, Ahmadinejad that trained the children and purchased some 500,000 pink plastic keys from Taiwan.²⁵

His comments on Israel have been extremely provocative and raised deep concerns, especially in Israel which felt existentially threatened. He spoke of the inequity of "the way the elected Government of the Palestinian people is treated" compared to the "support of the Zionist regime." In a conference in Teheran in October 2005 entitled "The World Without Zionism," he stated, "the establishment of the Zionist regime was a move by the world oppressor against the Islamic world," and

that the state of Israel was illegitimate. Referring to Ayatollah Khomeini, he stated, “as the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map.”

Ahmadinejad’s statements concerning other nuclear powers have been equally provocative. Accusing them of using “the deadly weapons” as “instruments of coercion and threat against other peoples and governments,” he stated they “consider themselves as the masters and rulers of the entire world and other nations as only second class in the world order.” Between the provocative comments on Israel and his flaunting of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which includes for nuclear enrichment, he seems to be pushing for confrontation and seeking chaos. Why?

To answer this question requires an understanding of Ahmadinejad’s religious beliefs. There is a messianic tradition within Islam that believes the Mahdi (the “guided one”), who is a descendant of the prophet, will appear *at a time of chaos* just before judgment day and this will introduce a period of universal peace under the leadership of Shi’ite Muslims. The “Twelver” branch of Shia Islam refers to the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, in lineal descent from the prophet, who is said to have gone into a state of “occultation” in 874 A.D. According to legend, he is not dead, but will reveal himself in a period of chaos for a battle in the final days.²⁶ Most “Twelvers” are quietists, waiting for the arrival of the hidden imam. But there is a group of Mahdists who are religious belligerents, seeking to precipitate the final days by promoting chaos, “Twelvers” activists. There is persuasive evidence that Ahmadinejad is an activist “Twelver.”

Ahmadinejad’s mentor is Ayatollah Yazdi, a committed “Twelvers” activist, a supporter of the clerical regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, and a supporter of his successor Supreme Leader Khamenei. Yazdi is considered the most conservative member of Khamenei’s inner circle. He is a member of the Council of Experts. It was Yazdi who persuaded the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah al-Khameini, to support Ahmadinejad’s presidential candidacy, a crucial political act that paved the way for his electoral victory election.

During his tenure as mayor of Teheran Ahmadinejad made major investments in preparing the infrastructure for the arrival of the Mahdi, which he informed an Iranian journalist would be in two years. After his surprise victory in the presidential election, he gave \$17 million to the

Jamkaran mosque, which houses the well from which “Twelvers” believe the Mahdi will emerge. In November 2005, he said publicly the main mission of the Islamic Republic was to bring about the reappearance of the Twelfth Iman.

After the September 2005 address to U.N. General Assembly, he was caught on videotape telling a cleric that during the speech a halo appeared around his head on the podium. “I felt the atmosphere suddenly change. And for those 27 or 28 minutes, the leaders of the world did not blink...It seemed as if a hand was holding them there, and it opened their eyes to receive the message from the Islamic Republic.”

So, if the apparent drive to develop a nuclear weapon and his calls to wipe Israel off the map seem designed to produce chaos, which may indeed be President Ahmadinejad’s goal as a committed “Twelver” Muslim, a Mahdist religious belligerent, who apparently believes actions that produce chaos can help hasten the arrival on earth of the messiah.

This has major implications for deterrability. If Iran were a leader predominant state, one would have to conclude Iran was not deterrable.

But in presenting this profile to the annual security conference in Herzlea, Israel, on a panel entitled “Can a Nuclear Iran be Deterred?” an important distinction was made. In contrast to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq who assuredly ruled a leader-predominant state, despite being president, Ahmadinejad not only did not control the major resources of the state, in fact, he was not the main decision-maker. This was the role occupied by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who has ultimate authority. As the Supreme Leader it is he who:

- determines the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- has the power to declare war and peace and general troop mobilization.
- resolves differences and regulate relations among the three branches of the government.
- appoints and dismisses the:
 - Members of the Council of Guardians
 - Head of the Judiciary
 - Director of radio and television networks
 - Chief of staff of the armed forces

- Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards
- Commander-in-Chief of the military and security services.

But Khamenei too is not entirely free to act, as he is constrained by a complex web of decision-making bodies, including the Assembly of Experts, the Council of Guardians and the Council of Expediency. So Iran, in vivid contrast to Iraq under Saddam Hussein represented the third type of state described by Hermann, Hermann and Hagan, one that is directed by multiple autonomous leader groups, with no one group having the sole authority.²⁷ So there is a complex matrix of competing forces, with pragmatists versus theocrats, and a Supreme Leader with ultimate authority and a President who is a religious conservative with a special sense of self, whose authority is constrained.

Moreover, it is important to take into account that 70 percent of the Iranian population under 30 years of age yearn to join the modern world. In contrast to North Korea, Iran is fully “wired” and connected to global connections networks. This restive population is actively informed through the internet. As a consequence, the reins of theocratic control are loosening.

Having a political personality profile of Ahmadinejad is necessary, but not sufficient in dealing with Iran as it pursues nuclear ambitions. A nuanced understanding of the complexities of Iranian decision-making, including profiles of the principal Iranian leaders and their complex interactions, is essential in attempting to influence Iran through coercive diplomacy.

Kim Jong-Il of North Korea: In the Shadow of His Father

One cannot understand the personality and political behavior of Kim Jong-Il without placing it in the context of the life and charismatic leadership of his father, Kim Il-Sung, North Korea’s first leader. One of the difficulties in assessing the personality and political behavior of Kim Il-Sung has always been discerning the man behind the myth. The gap between the facts that scholars have been able to piece together and the hagiographic portrait presented to the people of North Korea is staggering.

Kim Jong Il was raised to succeed his heroic, charismatic father, Kim Il Sung. But, the present North Korean leader is no guerrilla fighter or nation builder. He inherited his charismatic image and national ideology of *Juche* and reunification from his father. As director of the Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda, he played a major role both in creating the cult of personality surrounding his father, but also in creating the existing myth that he is the “Man from Mt. Paektu,” when in fact, he was raised in squalid circumstances under Soviet protection and is the boy from the U.S.S.R.

The disparity from his father contributes to profound insecurity in his son: “majesty sits uncomfortably on his shoulders.” His father’s giant shadow always looms over him. Succeeding a powerful father is a challenge. Succeeding a father of god-like stature is psychologically impossible. In many ways he is trapped by his father’s ideology.

Malignant Narcissism

Kim Jong-II’s personality also reflects, in his cultural context, malignant narcissism. His extreme grandiosity and self-absorption overlay extreme insecurity about stepping into his father’s god-like shoes. This insecurity is not just about his stature as a political leader, but also about his literal stature. Standing roughly 5 feet 2 inches tall, Kim Jong-II reportedly has platform shoes custom built for him to enhance his height and weighs in around 175 pounds. Clearly his short stature is a long-standing issue for him; he reportedly was teased as a boy, called “Shorty.” Upon first meeting the South Korean actress Choe Un-hui, whom he had kidnapped to help develop a North Korean movie industry, Kim reportedly asked, “Well, Madame Choe, what do you think of my physique? Small as a midget’s droppings, aren’t I?”²⁸ His hair is worn in a flamboyant style adding the appearance of additional height.

This long-standing insecurity leads him to be extremely sensitive to slights. He displays a lack of empathy for his own people, but this deficiency also leads him to not understand his adversaries. An aspect of his compensatory grandiosity is a tendency to be overly optimistic about himself and his nation and to underestimate his adversary. He has no constraint of conscience and has a paranoid orientation, and a tendency to find scapegoats when things do not go as he wishes.

Hedonistic Life Style

Kim has an extremely hedonistic lifestyle, especially striking, given the stark poverty in which most of his countrymen live. He lives in a seven-story pleasure palace in P'yong-yang, gives extravagant gifts to his senior leaders and likes to throw wild parties. Kim recruits young girls with clear complexions in junior high school for "joy brigades" to provide entertainment for his hard-working senior officials. During the 1990s, he spent between \$650,000 and \$800,000 annually on Hennessey Paradis Cognac, their most expensive cognac at \$630 a bottle, when the annual income of North Koreans was \$900-\$1000. Kim has a movie collection in excess of 10-20,000 titles.

Km Jong-II's Vulnerabilities

It is official DPRK policy that maintaining the military is the foremost priority. Military spending has come first at the expense of the North Korean economy and the general population. But the economy is broken and cannot be fixed. Communist-style central control and disproportionate military spending is leading to the implosion of the D.P.R.K. As many as three million North Koreans starved to death in famines; hundreds of thousands lost lives in subsequent relocation to government-run camps. Yet Kim Jong II asks the population to endure continuing hardships while the elite live in luxury.

What Kim Jong-II Values

While he pays lip service to pursuing the ideology of self-reliance (*Juche*), in fact he often plays the role of mendicant, seeking aid to keep his impoverished nation afloat. Often these requests are accompanied by belligerent threats in terms of his nuclear capability. He explains this source of funding as representing the tribute from nations who admire his leadership. But analysis reveals what he truly values are the following: his safety and regime survival; P'yong-yang, which is an oasis in the

impoverished desert of North Korea; his personal wealth; elite comfort; and total domestic control.

There is persuasive evidence that he cares not a whit for the North Korean peasant. He has lived an extravagantly luxurious lifestyle while tolerating starvation at home. In confronting North Korea's famine, saving lives has not been a top priority, and early in the famine cycle, Kim cut off nearly all food supplies to the four eastern provinces and denied these provinces access to international aid.²⁹ Large numbers of deaths also occurred when, between 1997 and 1999 on Kim's orders, several hundred thousand people displaced by the famine were herded into camps where conditions allowed few to survive.³⁰ Moreover, according to the testimony of eyewitnesses, Kim has ordered the systematic killing of babies born in North Korea's camps to political prisoners.³¹

This lack of concern for the Korean people is in contrast to the image of his father, Kim Il-Sung. Kim Jong-Il reportedly acknowledges the one occasion where he disobeyed The Great Leader and indeed seems to take pride in this incident:

Only once have I disobeyed President Kim Il Sung. The President said, "Can you shave off some defense spending and divert it for the people's livelihoods?" I responded, "I am afraid not. Given the military pressure from the U.S., the Korean people must bear the hardship a little longer." How much pain I felt at my failure to live up to the expectations of the President who is concerned about raising the living standards of the people!³²

The gap between the self-indulgent hedonistic lifestyle of Kim Jong Il and his inner circle in P'yong-yang and the privation of his people, and, for that matter, the lower-level military, is extreme. Kim regularly calls for sacrifice from the Korean people in pursuit of the mission of reunification. But the lack of sacrifice in the life of Dear Leader and his inner circle is striking. While information is tightly controlled, penetrating the information barriers with stories concerned with the lavish self-indulgent lifestyle of Kim and his inner circle could significantly undermine the legitimacy of his leadership and his capacity to sustain the public psychology to maintain the nation on a continuing war footing.

The Role of Strategic Communication in Undermining Kim Jong-II

As Bunn has emphasized, tailored communications are an important dimension of tailored deterrence. In vivid contrast to Iran, one of the most remarkable aspects of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea is the control it maintains over information, so that defectors are regularly surprised when they make their way via China to South Korea with the quality of life they discover. Penetrating information control is key. The above values and vulnerabilities of the Kim Jong-II regime suggest the utility of a program of strategic communications which:

- Identifies P'yong-yang as prime military target using extensive and overt surveillance,
- Counters the "one-a-match-for-one-hundred" military myth propagated by the DPRK by demonstrating US military capabilities, and
- "Educates" lower level military and the general population on the gap between their deprivation and the profligate hedonism of Kim Jong-II and the national elites.

On the other hand, some believe undermining the regime might cause it to initiate hostilities with the U.S. and ROK to divert North Koreans and cause them to rally against an external enemy rather than focus on regime shortcomings. In short, efforts at regime change might increase the chance of war and reduce U.S./ROK deterrence effects on North Korean behavior.

In the foregoing sections, key aspects of the personality and political behavior of the leadership of the "axis of evil" have been presented; these are highlights of major political personality profiles. The intent is not to prescribe particular courses of deterrence for these nations, but rather to reflect the diversity of the leadership and decision-making of key adversaries; there cannot be a "one size fits all" deterrence strategy. Moreover, it is to make clear that in order optimally to develop deterrent

strategies in the post-Cold world, it is imperative these strategies are tailored to fit the unique aspects of the leadership and strategic culture of the adversary in its unique political, cultural, historical and psychological context.

But in this age of terrorism, it would be remiss in reflecting on tailored deterrence not to consider how one might deter transnational terrorism, in particular, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda

In reflecting on deterrence and deterrability of a trans-national terrorist adversary, it is useful to consider the note that Mohammad Atta, the ringleader of Sept. 11, sent to the members of the four teams that would hijack the planes. Concerned they might betray their deadly mission with signs of facial anxiety, his notes communicated words to the effect of, *Be calm and serene. Have a smile upon your face, for soon you will be in Paradise.* But in his last will and testament, Atta prayed, quoting a *sura* from the Koran, *Spare me O Lord, a lifetime in shackles and irons.* While one should not uncritically extrapolate from Atta's words to the question of how to deter al-Qaeda from pursuing and employing weapons of mass destruction, it should give us pause to consider the prospect of death was considered calming for these potential martyrs, whereas life in prison was to be dreaded, suggesting that for Islamist fundamentalist terrorists, the death penalty was not a deterrent, but if anything an incentive, and a much more powerful deterrent would be life imprisonment without the prospect of release.³³

In the following remarks on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, a brief profile is presented; consideration is given to his interest in weapons of mass destruction, with implications for deterrence.³⁴

Osama bin Laden was born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1957, the 17th of 20-25 sons of Mohamed bin Laden, who had 52-54 children. Originally an immigrant from Yemen, Muhamed bin Laden, by befriending the royal family, had established a major construction company and had amassed a fortune of some \$2-3 billion by the time of his death in 1967 in a plane crash. Although estimates range from \$18 million to as high as \$200 million, it is most commonly agreed that bin

laden inherited approximately \$57 million at age 16 from his father's estate.

Osama's mother, Hamida, a Syrian woman of Palestinian descent was the least favorite of Mohamed's 10 wives, and Osama was the only child of this marriage, perhaps the basis of Osama bin Laden's later estrangement from his family. Hamida was reportedly a beautiful woman with a free and independent spirit who, as a result, often found herself in conflict with her husband. Reportedly, by the time Osama was born, Hamida had been ostracized by the family and had been nicknamed "Al Abeda" (the slave). As her only child, Osama was referred to as "Ibn Al Abeda" (son of the slave). Hamida did not live on the compound with the larger bin Laden family and as a result, was virtually non-existent in her son's early life. When Mohammed bin Laden died, Osama, at the age of 10, for all intents and purposes, did not know his mother.

Osama bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. He is a certified civil engineer, and worked toward a degree in Business Management (although it is not clear that he completed his course work), preparing him to play a leadership role in the family's far-flung business interests. These two skill areas would serve him in good stead in Afghanistan.

An important influence on bin Laden's political ideology was Abdullah Azzam, a radical Palestinian professor at the university who became an important intellectual mentor for bin Laden. It was Azzam, a noted Islamist, who provided the vision to bin Laden of what should be done in response to the invasion of the Muslim state of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and what role bin Laden could play. In particular, he conveyed to bin Laden the importance of bringing together Muslims from around the world to defend the Islamic nation of Afghanistan against the godless Soviet Union.

Demonstrating his already blossoming management skills, Osama bin Laden assisted Azzam who founded the international recruitment network Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services Office). MAK advertised all over the Arab world for young Muslims to fight the Afghan jihad. This massive international recruitment effort brought in Muslims from around the world who were to become the Afghan Arabs, the nucleus of bin Laden's loyal followership — 5,000 were recruited from Saudi Arabia,

3,000 from Algeria and 2,000 from Egypt. Recruitment booths were set up in the United States and Europe.

A leader is not formed until he encounters his followers, and bin Laden's leadership experience during the struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion was crucial in his psychological development which was transformational for him as a leader. He came to Afghanistan unformed and naïve. Generously using his own funds, he built clinics and hospitals. Eschewing an opulent lifestyle, he lived an ascetic life in the caves of Afghanistan with his followers. Regularly preaching about their holy mission and inspirational in his rhetoric, bin Laden inspired his followers who came to adulate him.

That they were able, with substantial American aid to be sure, to triumph over the Soviet Union in what was to become their Vietnam, surely confirmed the correctness of bin Laden's vision for him and his followers. Allah favored the weak and the underdog, and surely they could not have triumphed over the Soviet super-power unless God was on their side. This was the template of the destructive charismatic relationship between bin Laden and his religiously inspired warriors, the mujahedeen.

Bin Laden had not yet broken with the Saudi government, which after all, was the main foundation of his family's wealth. But he had successfully vanquished one of the three major enemies identified by Muhammad Abdel Salam Faraj, who wrote *The Neglected Duty: the existing Arab state, the Western-Zionist nexus, and the Communists*. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the critical enemy among this triad was the "near enemy," the Arab state, according to leading Islamists. In Faraj's manifesto, he argued, "We must begin with our Islamic country by establishing the rule of God in our nation...the first battle for jihad is the uprooting of these infidel leaders and replacing them with an Islamic system from which we can build."³⁵

Bin Laden had come to see the Soviet super-power as a "paper tiger" that could be defeated, but also had already set his sights on the remaining super-power, the United States, as the next target. This represented a fundamental departure from the strategy of Faraj, in that it replaced "the enemy that is near" with "the enemy that is afar," the super-powers.

With the victory in Afghanistan, bin Laden the warrior king and his loyal Afghan Arab fighters, were eager to continue to pursue the jihad. Bin Laden broadened his vision and decided to pursue the jihad on a worldwide basis, seeking to reconstruct the nation of Islam throughout the world, assisting Muslims who were in conflict in Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and so forth.

While bin Laden was committed to the international struggle, Abdullah Azzam believed in focusing all efforts on building Afghanistan into a model Islamic state. Following a split with Abdullah Azzam in 1988, with the nucleus of his loyal followers, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a founding father of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt, established al-Qaeda (The Base) as a direct outgrowth of MAK. The following year Abdullah Azzam died in a mysterious car bomb explosion. Although there has been suspicion of involvement by bin Laden, there has never been any proof linking him to the death of his one-time mentor.

But with the departure of the Soviet Union, in what was to become their Vietnam, the warrior-king bin Laden and his loyal warriors had lost their enemy. As Eric Hoffer observed, the power of a charismatic leader derives from his capacity to focus hatred against a single enemy, as Hitler did in the 1930s, unifying the German people in their hatred of the Jews. Bin Laden traveled to Sudan in 1999 and was distressed, indeed incensed, to find the United States with a military base on Saudi soil in the wake of the crisis in the Gulf, defiling the sacred Islamic land “of the two cities” (Mecca and Medina). Decrying this desecration of holy Saudi soil by the infidel Americans, bin Laden had seamlessly transferred his enmity from the first defeated super-power, the Soviet Union, to the remaining super-power, the United States, despite its aid in the struggle against the Soviet Union, which he dismissed.

Initially he sought only to expel the American military from Arab lands, but later in the 1998 fatwah, expanded the enemy to include all Americans, whether civilian or military, throughout the world. In the 1998 fatwa, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, bin Laden declared:

In compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it

is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God." We - with God's help - call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.³⁶

Note, in this message it is not bin Laden but God who has ordered religious Muslims to kill all the Americans; God for whom bin Laden speaks with authority. There is not an action bin Laden orders that is not couched and justified in language from the Koran.

Moreover, he actively criticized the Saudi royal family for apostasy, decrying the failure of stewardship of the land of the two cities, Mecca and Medina. The vigor of his criticism led Saudi Arabia to revoke his citizenship in 1994, and his family, which depended upon the Saudi leadership for their wealth, turned against him. This resembles the generational dynamics of social-revolutionary terrorists, such as the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades, who attack the generation of their family which is loyal to the regime.³⁷

Now bin Laden righteously attacked the other two enemies in the triad of enemies, the Western-Israeli nexus, and one of the newly designated apostate Arab nations, Saudi Arabia. But he maintained the primary focus on the external enemy, the United States. Yes, the leadership of the apostate nations had to be replaced, but the United States was the prime enemy, for America was responsible for propping up the corrupt leadership of these countries. Thus he continued the strategy born in Afghanistan of focusing on the enemy who is afar, the Zionist-Crusaders, rather than the enemy who is near, the *targhut* (oppressive domestic rulers).

There has been a series of triumphs for bin Laden—Khobar Towers, the first World Trade Center bombing, the bombings of the U.S.

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the attack on the U.S.S. *Cole* in Yemen, and now, the most spectacular terrorist act in history, the events of Sept. 11. Osama bin Laden seems to be on a roll, speaking with messianic grandiosity, ever expanding his vision. The events of Sept. 11 were in many ways a “perfect storm.” A destructive charismatic leader manipulated, in Eric Hoffer’s words, “the slime of discontented souls”³⁸ to focus the hatred and violence of his “true believers” against the identified enemy, the United States.

Al-Qaeda and the Threat of WMD Terrorism

Al-Qaeda and its allies have shown a willingness to perpetrate acts of mass casualty terrorism, as exemplified by the bombings of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Osama bin Laden, responsible for the embassy bombings and the attacks of Sept. 11, has actively discussed the use of weapons of mass destruction in public interviews. In an interview with Jon Miller of *ABC News* in May 1998, bin Laden first discussed such weapons.

In a follow-up interview with *TIME* magazine, in January of 1999, when asked, “The U.S. says you are trying to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons. How would you use these?” Bin Laden replied, “Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so... It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons.”³⁹ Whether this was psychological warfare or represented genuine intent is not entirely clear. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are not seen as constrained against carrying out chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks, including attacks against the defined major enemy, the United States.

How does one tailor deterrence for an adversary whose members seek martyrdom? Is such an adversary deterrable? Not in the conventional sense. But let us rephrase the question: how can we reduce the threat of CBRNE terrorism?

It is difficult for the West to critique radical interpretations of Islamic doctrine which have been employed by bin Laden and his

leadership to justify mass casualty terrorism. Moderate critics have until recently been muted. But, recently there have been cleavages in the ranks with internal critics of extremist violence beginning to speak out.

- Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) who was a radical ideologue whose earlier work has set the template for al-Qaeda's violent jihad: "There is nothing that invokes the anger of God and his wrath like the unwarranted spilling of blood and wrecking of property," *The Rationalization of Jihad*
- Salman Al Ouda, a radical Saudi cleric, "My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt?"
- Noman Benotman-Open letter rebuking Zawahiri.

The conflict initially was highly personalized focusing on Osama bin Laden, who, in President Bush's words, was "wanted dead or alive," with a \$25,000,000 bounty on his head. Each personalized threat against bin Laden only served to magnify his stature among his constituents.

Moreover, there was an implication that the capture or death of bin Laden would mean the end of the threat. This assuredly is not the case, for al-Qaeda differs significantly from other terrorist groups and organizations, perhaps reflecting bin Laden's training in business management. Al-Qaeda was a loose umbrella organization of semi-autonomous terrorist groups and organizations. In effect, bin Laden was chairman of the board of radical Islam, Inc., a holding company, providing guidance, coordination, and financial and logistical facilitation, and expanded his corporation through mergers and acquisitions.

Unlike other charismatically led organizations, such as Guzman's Sendero Luminosa (Shining Path) of Peru, Ocalan's PKK of Turkey, and Prabhakaran's Tamil Tigers, all of which were mortally wounded when their leader was killed or captured, bin Laden designated Ayman al-Zawahiri as his successor and number two and has delegated significant authority and responsibility to other members of his organization. Should bin Laden be killed or captured, the reins of the organization would pass seamlessly to Zawahiri. Should the entire leadership echelon be eliminated, the threat, while diminished, would still remain. It is estimated al-Qaeda operates in 68 nations, and the semi-autonomous

organizations under its umbrella would devolve and continue to pursue their terrorist mission.

President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair took pains to clarify this is not a war against Muslims, but a war against terrorism. Seeking to frame this as a religious war, bin Laden has now laid claim to the title of commander-in-chief of the Islamic world, opposing the commander-in-chief of the corrupt, secular modernizing Western world; President George W. Bush is in a religious war. Alienated Arab youth find resonance in his statements, and see him as a hero.

And this is the real challenge. Osama bin Laden may be eliminated and the al-Qaeda network rolled up, but the path of anti-Western radical Islamist extremism is increasingly attractive to alienated Islamic youth. Terrorism, at heart, is a vicious species of psychological warfare; it is violence as communication. Smart bombs and missiles will not win this war. The only way to combat this vicious species of psychological warfare is with information warfare, countering the distorted extremist rhetoric of Osama bin Laden and radical Islamist clerics that rationalizes violence with verses from the Koran. This will be a long struggle.

One of the key tools in this struggle is tailored communications that accomplishes four goals.⁴⁰ First, inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group in the first place by de-romanticizing terrorists, providing alternate pathways to redress grievances, assisting in opening up autocratic societies and encouraging moderate secular education.

Secondly, it will be important to produce dissension in the terrorist group. The underground group is an emotional pressure-cooker, and it may be possible to foster paranoia by injecting rumors of traitors in the ranks. Also, a tailored communication plan should attempt to alienate followers from leaders and facilitate the cleavages in the ranks.

A third goal of anti-terrorist communications plan is to facilitate exodus from the group by its members. This can perhaps be accomplished by measures such as amnesty programs, offering reduced sentences for those who cooperate and using defector as a source of rumors to sow distrust.

Fourth and finally, the communications plan should try to reduce support for the group and delegitimize its leaders in society at large and in the recruitment pool. The program should seek to marginalize al-Qaeda

and delegitimize bin Laden.

The alienated Islamic youth must not see violence as the only pathway. Most importantly, support for this dangerous movement must be reduced, so that radical Islamic extremism is marginalized, its leaders delegitimized. The program above summarizes a program of tailored communication designed to counter terrorism. What themes should be incorporated into such a tailored program to inhibit the development and use of weapons of destruction?

Let us turn to the terrorists for answers to this question. Among the incarcerated Islamist terrorists we interviewed, when asked about their views concerning weapons of mass destruction, most said something to the effect of “*just give me a good Kalashnikov.*”⁴¹

While the majority was not averse to using a weapon that could kill 10,000 enemies, many had not even considered it. But some raised reservations. One spoke of his fear of “the silent death,” concerns about dangers from handling poisons or bacteria. Another quoted the Koran and its prohibitions against poisoning the creatures of the earth.

In a focused program of psychological warfare, tailored communication designed to counter the development and use of weapons of mass destruction, these two themes should be prominently featured, i.e., the danger of the “silent death” and the prohibition in the Koran against poisoning the creatures of the earth.

Conclusion

In this post-Cold War era, given the variability of the leaders described above, deterrence must be tailored and based on nuanced actor-specific behavioral models. This in turn requires increased intelligence resources devoted to developing such models, for it is now more true than ever, in this era of rogue leaders of outlaw nations and transnational terrorism, there is no one-size-fits-all deterrence.

An important aspect of the analysis of adversary intentions is the locus of decision-making. When it is a leader- predominant society, such as Iraq under Saddam, and the leader is judged to not be deterrable, this calls for a tailored communications program designed to drive a wedge between the leader and his followers. This is also true for a more complex

leadership society with multiple autonomous actors, such as Iran, where on the one hand President Ahmadinejad may not be deterrable, may indeed be seeking chaos, but he is not the sole or even principal actor.

A special dilemma is posed by transnational radical Islamist terrorism, many of whose members seek martyrdom. For this challenging target, a four-point program of tailored communications is proposed with the overall goal of reducing the ranks of terrorists by inhibiting potential terrorists from joining the group, producing dissension in the group, facilitating exit from the group, and reducing support for the group and delegitimizing its leaders. Messages designed to inhibit the development and uses of weapons of mass destruction are included in the suggested program.

Notes

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- ¹³ James Blight, et al., *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 29.
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- ¹⁷ M. Elaine Bunn, "Can Deterrence be Tailored?," *Strategic Forum*, Volume 225 (Jan. 2007).
- ¹⁸ Bunn, *op cit*.
- ¹⁹ Margaret Hermann, C. Charles, F. Hermann, and Joe Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior," Chapter 16, *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).
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- ²³ "Confrontation in the Gulf: Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy," *The New York Times* (Sept. 23, 1990).
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- ²⁶ This resembles messianic traditions of the "final days" in Christianity and in Judaism. The use of weapons of mass destruction by Shoko Asahara of the Japanese millenarian cult Aum Supreme Truth also was designed to precipitate the final apocalypse.
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- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 73-74.
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³² Kim Myong Chol, “Kim Jong Il’s Military Strategy for Reunification,” *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 20(4) (2001), 305.

³³ This consideration was introduced in testimony by the author during the death penalty phase of the 2001 trial of one of the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaan, Tanzania in 1998. The defendant was sentenced to life without parole in a super-max prison.

³⁴ This brief profile is drawn from the introductory chapter “The Explosive Force of Personality and Political Behavior” of *Leaders and their Followers in a Dangerous World* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 5-9.

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³⁶ World Islamic Front, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” *Al-Quds al-Arabi* (Feb. 23, 1998).

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³⁸ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper and Row, [1951] 1966), 59-60.

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⁴⁰ For an extended discussion of the important role of psychological operations as a principal weapon in countering terrorism, see Jerrold Post, “Psychological Operations and Counter-Terrorism,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 2005), 105-110.

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