

Toward A National Counterproliferation Strategic Communication Plan

*An Input to the Interagency Process to Help Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction Threats*

by

Richard H. Estes

Project Director

with

Jeff Jones

Susan Gough

Dan Burgess



US Air Force
Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Toward a National Counterproliferation Strategic Communication Plan

*An Input to the Interagency Process to Help
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats*

Final Report

By

RICHARD H. ESTES
Project Director

With

JEFF JONES
SUSAN GOUGH
DAN BURGESS

USAF Counterproliferation Center

National Counterproliferation Strategic Communication Plan

*An Input to the Interagency Process to Help
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats*

Final Report

December 2007

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established to provide education, information, and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy – makers and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. This research was funded jointly by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office and the USAF Counterproliferation Center. Copies of this report and other publications are available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL, 36112-06427. The fax number is (334) 953-7530; phone (334) 953-7538.

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is

<http://cpc.au.af.mil>

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Disclaimer	ii
Acknowledgments	v
Executive Summary	vii
Preface: Some Thoughts on Strategic Communication	xv
1.1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Purpose	
1.3. Statement of the Problem	
1.4. Strategic Communication Definitions	
1.5. Scope	
2.1. Goals and Objectives.....	2
2.2. Strategic Goal	
2.3. Supporting Strategic Communication Objectives	
3.1. Strategic Communication Process and Components	3
3.2. The Strategic Communication Process	
3.3. Strategic Communication Components	
4.1. Roles and Responsibilities.....	6
4.2. White House and National Security Council	
4.3. State Department	
4.4. Department of Defense	
4.5. Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Intelligence Community	
4.6. Other Executive Branch Departments and Agencies	
5.1. Audiences.....	8
5.2. Nonproliferation Supporters	
5.3. Proliferators	
5.4. General International	
5.5. Internal U.S. Audiences	
6.1. Themes and Messages.....	11
6.2. Deter and Dissuade Countries from Proliferating	
6.3. Deter and Dissuade Countries against acquiring WMD	
6.4. Gain the Active Support from All Nations to Combat WMD Proliferation	

7.1. Conduit and Calendar Exploitation.....	15
7.2. Conduits and Venues for Message Delivery	
7.3. Identified Calendar Events for Exploitation	
Annex A – Representative Calendar Exploitation Plan	17
Annex B – Islamic Republic of Iran	35
Annex C – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.....	45
Annex D – Republic of India	57
Notes	65

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project was sponsored and funded by the Advance Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO), Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We at the USAF Counterproliferation Center appreciate the continuing support from this directorate, one of our original and most generous sponsors. I would like to thank particularly Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gruny of ASCO for his interest, participation, and support – and later, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Arrington for his. Second, I would like to thank our subcontractors, the Strategic Communication Team at Booz Allen Hamilton, headed by Mr. Jeff Jones, with which the USAF Counterproliferation Center partnered to complete this project. The members of Mr. Jones’s superb team are Susan Gough and Dan Burgess.

Finally, I wish to thank the entire staff of the USAF Counterproliferation Center for its support. Dr. Barry Schneider, the Director of the Center, has been involved at every stage of this project, has made presentations, and has offered countless valuable inputs. Dr. Jerry Post, an associate member of the Center, provided valuable contacts, and offered substantial encouragement on the subject. The remainder of the staff provided support throughout. Thanks to all.

RICHARD H. ESTES
Strategic Communication Project Director
USAF Counterproliferation Center

NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLAN

Executive Summary

The greatest threat facing the United States is the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations and aggressive, hostile nations. However, the enduring international perceptions that the U.S. is the predominant target belie the reality that the threat is shared and that all remain potentially affected. The U.S. must convince the rest of the world that weapons of mass destruction threaten them also, and that it is critical we all work together to eliminate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. must develop not just a strategic communication plan to combat the threat and its consequences, but also the interagency processes, systems, means, and coordination mechanisms to effectively conduct strategic communication.

The image of the U.S. amongst foreign audiences is at an all-time low. The poor perception of the U.S. and its intents by most audiences around the world will negatively affect the ability of U.S. messengers to influence foreign audiences. Consequently, an effective strategic communication program must incorporate allied collaboration and conduits from the outset.

The strategic goals and objectives for counterproliferation, and the strategic communication objectives supporting those national strategic goals, are interconnected with other national security objectives and vice versa. A strategic communication plan supporting counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) must be integrated, synchronized, and deconflicted with all other strategic communication plans supporting national objectives to ensure that U.S. messages to global audiences are consistent. The following themes and messages are important:

- Deter and dissuade countries from proliferating.
 - Support to proliferants will not be tolerated. There will be military, political and economic consequences.
 - Proliferator suppliers will be held accountable.
- Deter and Dissuade countries from acquiring WMD.
 - Devalue adversary WMD and missiles.
 - Acquisition of WMD is detrimental to your interests.
 - Not pursuing WMD will advance your national interests.
 - WMD and related material proliferation will be prevented, defeated, or reversed.
 - The United States Government reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force, with all options and means available of all elements of our national power, to the use of WMD against the U.S., our forces abroad, and our allies and friends.

- Gain the active support from all nations to combat WMD proliferation.
 - WMD is not just a threat to the U.S., but to every nation, to everyone, around the world.
 - The United States is your ally and is a reliable and trusted custodian of nuclear weapons.
 - Combating WMD promotes global security and prosperity.
 - The greatest threat to the world today is terrorists using nuclear weapons.
 - The protection of WMD technology, expertise, and materials is essential.

Iran's nuclear program cannot be ignored. However, before we can begin to improve the situation, we must allay their fears that the U.S. is planning regime change in Iran, and as Robert Litvak has said, "Give them a chance to say 'yes.'"¹ Removing the fear of imminent invasion is the first step to opening a dialog with Tehran and ultimately convincing them not to proliferate. Furthermore, we must enlist the help of all our allies and friends as well as international organizations to persuade Iran that it is in their best interest not to continue down the path of nuclear proliferation.

Currently, the Bush Administration has relied on the Six-Party Talks as the centerpiece for reconciliation over the North Korean nuclear issue. Leveraging our allies and friends is important, and the strategy may be paying off. But the U.S. must continue to unite the Six-Party nations with a unified strategy and not allow North Korea to divisively play participants against each other. North Korea has shut down its reactor at Yongbyon, and has allowed UN inspectors back in to verify progress. Next steps should include the permanent disabling of the reactor, among others, and eventually chemical and biological programs should be put on the table.

India's nuclear policy has endured for over 30 years; it is unlikely that U.S. or international sanctions, policies, or actions will change India's nuclear strategy. However, the U.S. does need to better explain our Indian-based policies, and ensure that Iran and North Korea are not sent the wrong message. The strategic communication strategy for India should explain our current policy with regards to India, as well as why our relationship is important; reinforce India's obligation not to conduct further nuclear tests; and foster a climate which will prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies (e.g., nuclear exports).

The attached plan includes strategic goals, strategic communication objectives, agency roles and responsibilities, a discussion of the strategic communication process, and recommended audiences, themes and messages for a national-level strategic communication plan to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also includes a representative year long projection of national security-related events which provide informational and influencing opportunities, and special sections on Iran, North Korea, and India.

Broad Considerations and Recommendations

First, policies matter. The best strategic communication plan will not make up for poorly conceived policies. In one sense, policies should be a subset of strategic communication, not the reverse. We should ask ourselves "what image do we wish to project, and how does the proposed policy fit that image?"

Second, separate approaches must be taken for those international elements that are considered deterrable and those that are not. Whether those elements divide neatly between nation states and terrorist organizations remains to be seen.

Third, a compelling message must be developed that explains why the possession of weapons of mass destruction by the United States, specifically nuclear weapons, is to the advantage of the international community – even while the U.S. insists that others forsake such a capability. This involves *confidence building* in the leadership and peaceful intentions of the United States – a very long process.

Fourth, any strategic communication campaign must find itself in regional expertise, even while playing off of a central national message. Experts on the ground must fine tune that national message to reflect regional alliances, tensions, and influence networks.

Fifth, no one agency in our government can do this alone. A robust and sustainable interagency process is required – a demonstrably weak point in the past.

Finally, no plan or message will be successful without the complete support and participation of the President, as well as a robust and sustainable interagency process involving all policy-making centers of the United States government. Further, this process must be virtually indistinguishable from the policy-making itself. Policy and communications cannot proceed on separate tracks.

With those basic tenets in mind, here then are other considerations when communicating our message on combating weapons of mass destruction to the world:

- First bolster our relations with allies, then with other rational international actors, to isolate rogue states and terrorists and to dry up WMD supplier networks. Messages to our friends will have more impact than will threats to foes that we may not be able to deter from WMD supplying, acquisition, or use.
- Nevertheless, direct messages to adversaries that show the increased costs to them if they acquire WMD, as well as the reduced benefits from possessing or using WMD.
- Assume that WMD possession by terrorists is tantamount to use, but craft a message that reinforces the counterproductive nature to the terrorists' cause of such use (similar to the manner that the televised al Zaraqawi beheadings were counterproductive to his organization's cause). Terrorists, while not conforming to western definitions of rationality, may in fact be self-deterred under the proper set of circumstances. Their core constituency must be satisfied, and that constituency may not find the indiscriminate use of WMD acceptable. Conversely, chemical or biological weapons may not make a large enough impact initially – although the anthrax letters of 2001 would seem to indicate otherwise.

- Assume that dissuading rational states from acquiring WMD programs is easier than causing programs to be rolled back or dismantled, but emphasize the advantages to the countries which have already rolled back WMD arsenals such as Libya, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
- Stress the suicidal futility of employing WMD in a regional conflict in such areas as South Asia, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. Such an attack may not engender an in-kind response by the United States, but at least in South Asia or the Middle East, a nuclear attack against another nuclear nation almost certainly would result in a regional nuclear war. And we have already seen tit-for-tat chemical attacks and responses in the Iran-Iraq war of the eighties.
- While there may be perfectly plausible and beneficial reasons for doing so, consider the effects of allowing countries to either violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – or not participate in the first place – and still be rewarded. Examples are India, Pakistan, and Israel.
- In that same vein, consider the effects on our moral capacity to lead of non-participation or non-compliance by the United States with selected conventions. Examples of programs we have opted out of while encouraging others to participate, are treaties on land mines, global warming, and the International War Crimes Tribunal. U.S. delinquency on contributions to the United Nations has a similar effect. Again, there may be compelling reasons for U.S. non-compliance, but such non-compliance comes at a cost in international reputation – particularly in dealing with international nonproliferation regimes such as the NPT.
- Consider involving businesses and international organizations in the international diplomacy necessary to promote our message abroad. There is evidence that such organizations would be more than willing to participate in public diplomacy and one-on-one relationships around the world to help the United States to promote its image. It is to their advantage to be associated with a widely respected government.
- Chart opportunities for engagement on WMD issues and take advantage of those opportunities. Annex A of this report outlines a Representative Calendar Exploitation Plan with which an actual engagement plan on combating WMD can be formulated.

Specific Recommendations by Country

The annexes on Iran, North Korea, and India provide samples of more focused strategic communication plans. However, such subordinate supporting plans cannot stand alone. They must be integrated and synchronized with other efforts in the struggle against proliferation. In today's global information environment, all strategic communication is interrelated. One cannot address counterproliferation in one country or region in isolation without considering the activities of the U.S. and its allies elsewhere.

Recommendations: Iran

- Pursue the possibility of face-to-face engagement between top-level U.S. and Iranian officials.
- President Bush should announce that the U.S. would be willing to take the initial steps to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran with a view toward eventually opening an embassy in Tehran.
- U.S. should announce that Iran has the right to have nuclear power, provided it is in full compliance with the NPT and provide tangible support towards that development.
- Emphasize that new diplomatic efforts and dialogue towards Iran mean compliance with IAEA verification of Iranian nuclear facilities.
- Announce that if Iran cooperates, the U.S. will help them become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- Convince Iran that bellicose pronouncements about the existence of Israel and the Holocaust does not serve Iran's national interests.
- Convince Israel to make a statement in support of new U.S. diplomatic developments between the U.S. and Iran.
- Convince Israel to tone-down their public statements about attacking Iran.
- Engage with U.S. allies and friends to increase security guarantees, especially with China, Russia, and the EU3.
- Develop a compendium of past Iranian statements concerning their intentions regarding WMD, statements by Iranian dissidents, former scientists, et al., concerning WMD.
- Provide detailed descriptions and diagrams of exactly how far the Iranians have gone in WMD-related production.
- IAEA, EU3 and UN consider sponsoring the above documents on dedicated TV and radio specials, and consider establishment of a WMD-related website shared with allies that would contain data, ranges, WMD conventions of which Iran is a signatory, together with statements by Iranian leaders, scientists, expatriates, et al.
- Produce TV reruns of Chernobyl, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Translate into Persian Farsi and transmit via all means available into Iran, including the Internet.
- Distribute diagrams and fact sheets of range delivery fans for Iran's current missile and aircraft fleet.

- Distribute figures depicting how much money has been spent to date on the nuclear program contrasted with the amount spent on the average Iranian citizen.

Recommendations: North Korea

- Washington and Beijing need to reach a new understanding on the future of the Korean peninsula and settle on an endgame strategy in North Korea to force a shift in Mr. Kim's strategic thinking.
 - China's interests in a non-nuclear North Korea focus on preventing nuclear proliferation elsewhere in Asia — especially Japan, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan.
 - China has its own battle with Muslim extremists in the far western province of Xinjiang and the last thing Beijing would want is for there to be any danger of Uighur terrorists obtaining nuclear materials from a proliferating Pyongyang.
- Send a high ranking envoy to Pyongyang to discuss non-proliferation and possible ending of the Korean War.
 - Develop steps to bring North Korea into the community of nations (this should also be a strategy for all participants).
 - Begin dialogue about a possible embassy in Pyongyang.
- Bind together energy assistance with denuclearization; China and South Korea should lead this effort.
- U.S. announce trade liberalization with and by North Korea or possible credit installments extended to North Korea and collateralized by claims on its mineral resources.
- Announce that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be strengthened and expanded to encompass surface and air surveillance and interdiction of suspected exports of nuclear materials and weapon-system components.
- Appeal to Japan to conduct high-level talks with Pyongyang – preferably Prime Minister Abe.
- Engage Russia and convince them that a rogue North Korean element may sell nuclear technology into the hands of Muslim militants — in its case, the Chechnya separatists; convince the Russians to leverage their influence towards denuclearization.
- Announce U.S. and Japanese/ROK Missile Defense talks and discuss deployment – which is underway. Reassuring the Japanese on this issue and making South Korea an equal partner are critical steps.

Recommendations: India

- Work to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. As agreed to in the US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act; transference, in any manner, remains extremely important and U.S.-Indian cooperation needs to be demonstrated.
 - Build trust through information sharing. One of the most important ways to build trust is to share information and intelligence with allies and friends. Through a shared perspective of threats the U.S. and India can strengthen their alliance and minimize regional threats, as well as ensure security of nuclear material.
 - Help India and Pakistan with hi-tech assistance for nuclear security. Providing monitoring and intelligence apparatus to ensure nuclear security will enable India and Pakistan to provide better security for nuclear weapons and infrastructure.
- Encourage India and Pakistan to reconcile the Kashmir issue. Indo-Pakistani reconciliation of the Kashmir issue will alleviate much of the pressure between these neighboring countries and could lead to minimizing Chinese influence and nuclear proliferation in the region.
- Leverage the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Minimizing the threat between Pakistan and India will help build mutual trust and reduce nuclear and missile competition.
 - Encourage state visits between India and Pakistan.
 - Provide economic incentives for Indo-Pakistani cooperation.
- Ensure that Indian and Pakistani leaders have emergency communications to stop inadvertent nuclear exchanges. This would be much like the old Soviet Union-U.S. “hot line” designed to minimize nuclear accidents, ambiguous incidents, or unauthorized actions that might lead to the outbreak of a nuclear exchange.
- Encourage India, Pakistan, and China to work for a regional moratorium on fissile material production. Limiting total numbers of material produced will help minimize tensions, lessen the threat of lost material, and encourage regional cooperation.
- Work with India to develop an overarching strategic vision to guide bilateral U.S.-Indian relations and reconcile the interests of both countries. Such a vision would provide a means for the United States to engage India in a way that supports larger American strategic interests, such as stability in Asia, freedom of navigation in the northern Indian Ocean, coalition arrangements in support of peace operations, and the prevention of further diffusion of weapons of mass destruction.²
- Encourage regional economic ties. ASEAN could be a possible conduit for the establishment of economic free trade agreements (FTA) or other economic vehicles.

PREFACE

SOME THOUGHTS ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Richard H. Estes

In January of 2007, the USAF Counterproliferation Center and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency co-hosted a major conference entitled *Terrorists, Rogue States, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. At that conference, for the first time, the agenda included a panel on using strategic communication to combat weapons of mass destruction. Composed of three senior-level officials from the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the State Department, the panelists were besieged with questions after their presentations, and were mobbed on stage after the panel was complete. The speakers were good, to be sure, but I believe the spontaneous enthusiasm was a direct result of a pent-up appetite for a more effective way to tell the story of the United States – and for the assembled crowd at that January conference, a more effective way for the U.S. to demonstrate leadership in the struggle to prevent further proliferation of WMD.

This report completes the second phase of the USAF Counterproliferation Center's study of – and advocacy for – using strategic communication to combat WMD. The first phase resulted in the report and monograph *A Message Not Yet Sent*. The Center surveyed the field, enlisted allies, and identified the yawning gap that existed at the national level then – and still does today – for any sort of coherent national process linking policy to message on almost any subject. But the gap seemed particularly wide when it came to a message for stopping the proliferation of WMD. This second phase provides a straw man campaign for transmitting that message. In a growing quest for a national-level strategic communication campaign, what would a module aimed at combating WMD look like?

An Interagency Strategy

There has been some progress. Before her resignation in November 2007, Karen Hughes was on the job as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for almost two years. She created an interagency working group that developed a strategic communication strategy, and the strategy is quite good as far as it goes. *Policies matter* however, and this strategy is written as if it is independent of policy-making in the United States Government – which it absolutely cannot be if it is to be effective.

The measures outlined in the strategy are all necessary and useful – and underused at present. But it stops short of placing a proactive tool in the hands of leadership. The U.S. Government *must* have a way, led by the President, of creating a central message, and referring to that message for every action it takes. And of course, combating WMD should be included in that message. The Australians have such a system, which they term *shaping and influencing activities*, in which the Prime Minister leads an interagency effort to ensure the national message clearly expresses national aims and objectives. Admittedly, they have a much easier problem than does the United States – aiming to promote the softer Koala bear-kangaroo-peacekeeper

image – and have been very successful in doing so. The United States has vastly greater global responsibilities, and carrying those out does not always promote a cuddly image. Still, our policies should make sense, and we should be able to explain to the world why we are implementing a given policy – in language and messages the countries and organizations of the world will comprehend – even if they don't agree in every instance.

Included in the interagency strategy are the following strong ideas:

- The isolation of extremists by nurturing common interests and values with allies and those that could be our allies.
- Increased cooperation with the private sector, in whose best interests promoting a positive image of the United States rest.
- Recognizing the differences between mass and specific target audiences.
- Finding “key influencers” in a specific country or region, and expecting our people on the ground there to assist in doing so.
- Highlighting mainstream voices among the 1.1 billion Muslims around the world.
- Highlighting development and disaster assistance – the *diplomacy of deeds*.
- Reinforcing core themes in all U.S. Government messages.
- Sharing the best of American culture.
- Using all relevant platforms and technologies to electronically keep up with changing audiences.
- Placing a top priority on de-legitimizing terror.
- Emphasizing evaluation and accountability.
- Increasing funding for priority programs.

The weakest area in this plan is that of interagency coordination. Among the solutions suggested in the interagency strategy is the establishment of a Counterterrorism Communication Center which would manage crisis communications. Of course we must speak with one voice during a crisis, but this national strategy should be aimed at heading off these crises rather than attempting to explain our actions after they occur – the definition of spin.

Assuming a coherent national message is forthcoming, the strong points of this national strategy outlined above certainly can be used to reinforce that message around the world. Policy makers should consider that national message as the United States makes decisions affecting

WMD proliferation. Our study, which follows, outlines ways in which combating WMD can be integrated effectively with other elements of a national message.

Adding Measures to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

Any coherent national message and strategic communication campaign for combating WMD, regardless of the creating administration, would almost certainly consider these self-evident aspects of that message and the process whereby it is created:

First, policies matter. The best strategic communication plan will not make up for poorly conceived policies. In one sense, policies should be a subset of strategic communication, not the reverse. We should ask ourselves “what image do we wish to project, and how does the proposed policy fit that image?”

Second, separate approaches must be taken for those international elements that are considered deterrable and those that are not. Whether those elements divide neatly between nation states and terrorist organizations remains to be seen.

Third, a compelling message must be developed that explains why the possession of weapons of mass destruction by the United States, specifically nuclear weapons, is to the advantage of the international community – even while the U.S. insists that others forsake such a capability. This involves *confidence building* in the leadership and peaceful intentions of the United States – a very long process.

Fourth, any strategic communication campaign must find itself in regional expertise, even while playing off of a central national message. Experts on the ground must fine tune that national message to reflect regional alliances, tensions, and influence networks.

Fifth, no one agency in our government can do this alone. A robust and sustainable interagency process is required – a demonstrably weak point in the past.

Finally, no plan or message will be successful without the complete support and participation of the President, as well as a robust and sustainable interagency process involving all policy-making centers of the United States government. Further, this process must be virtually indistinguishable from the policy-making itself. Policy and communications cannot proceed on separate tracks.

With those basic tenets in mind, here then are other considerations when communicating our message on combating weapons of mass destruction to the world:

- First bolster our relations with allies, then with other rational international actors, to isolate rogue states and terrorists and to dry up WMD supplier networks. Messages to our friends will have more impact than will threats to foes that we may not be able to deter from WMD supplying, acquisition, or use.

- Nevertheless, direct messages to adversaries that show the increased costs to them if they acquire WMD, as well as the reduced benefits from possessing or using WMD.
- Assume that WMD possession by terrorists is tantamount to use, but craft a message that reinforces the counterproductive nature to the terrorists' cause of such use (similar to the manner that the televised al Zarfawi beheadings were counterproductive to his organization's cause). Terrorists, while not conforming to western definitions of rationality, may in fact be self-deterred under the proper set of circumstances. Their core constituency must be satisfied, and that constituency may not find the indiscriminate use of WMD acceptable. Conversely, chemical or biological weapons may not make a large enough impact initially – although the anthrax letters of 2001 would seem to indicate otherwise.
- Assume that dissuading rational states from acquiring WMD programs is easier than causing programs to be rolled back or dismantled, but emphasize the advantages to the countries which have already rolled back WMD arsenals such as Libya, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
- Stress the suicidal futility of employing WMD in a regional conflict in such areas as South Asia, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. Such an attack may not engender an in-kind response by the United States, but at least in South Asia or the Middle East, a nuclear attack against another nuclear nation almost certainly would result in a regional nuclear war. And we have already seen tit-for-tat chemical attacks and responses in the Iran-Iraq war of the eighties.
- While there may be perfectly plausible and beneficial reasons for doing so, consider the effects of allowing countries to either violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – or not participate in the first place – and still be rewarded. Examples are India, Pakistan, and Israel.
- In that same vein, consider the effects on our moral capacity to lead of non-participation or non-compliance by the United States with selected conventions. Examples of programs we have opted out of while encouraging others to participate, are treaties on land mines, global warming, and the International War Crimes Tribunal. U.S. delinquency on contributions to the United Nations has a similar effect. Again, there may be compelling reasons for U.S. non-compliance, but such non-compliance comes at a cost in international reputation – particularly in dealing with international nonproliferation regimes such as the NPT.
- Consider involving businesses and international organizations in the international diplomacy necessary to promote our message abroad. There is evidence that such organizations would be more than willing to participate in public diplomacy and one-on-one relationships around the world to help the United States to promote its image. It is to their advantage to be associated with a widely respected government.

- Chart opportunities for engagement on WMD issues and take advantage of those opportunities. Annex A of this report outlines a Representative Calendar Exploitation Plan with which an actual engagement plan on combating WMD can be formulated.

Other Considerations

Charles Silver of the U.S. Department of State stated at our conference in January that, while strategic communication is vitally important and underused, the business of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction still may require “plain old hard-nosed conventional diplomacy . . . The PD in public diplomacy does not stand for *pixie dust*.” Further, he believes the term “weapons of mass destruction,” may in itself be a counterproductive to the diplomacy process. If true, there is no obvious solution to the latter, the memories of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, whether from tests or deliberate attacks, being so abhorrent as perhaps to defy intelligent discussion or the creation of useful messages.

Silver and others also believe that a return to the salad days of the U.S. Information Service and Agency is unlikely, but there still needs to be better venues and more operatives for spreading our message. The aforementioned *diplomacy of deeds* by which we respond with our spectacular ability to aid in crises around the world is one area that will always be available to us – because we do the right things whenever such actions are humanly possible. The fact that those deeds are from time to time overshadowed by our more forceful actions around the world should not deter us. Personnel and cultural exchanges are other methods for displaying the American way of life, but the former have become more difficult since 9/11, and the latter have been on the wane for years as funding has decreased. Speaking programs, literature distribution, and the placement of American libraries and centers abroad have not fared any better. All of these programs have proven effective in the past to demonstrate the great compassion and leadership of the United States and they should be vigorously pursued, not only as part of a long-range confidence building program, but as a demonstration abroad of that which has made America the symbol of freedom and good will around the world in days past.

Inside of the Department of Defense, there has been steady progress and organizations are growing in both OSD and the Joint Staff, but still no single point of contact for the strategic communication message exists – a goal that others in and outside of the Pentagon frequently have wished for the department. In practice, with an organization the size of the Department of Defense (25,000 are inside the Pentagon alone), perhaps looking for one person with the message is too much to ask. But strategic communication annexes to plans are being written, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has a senior civilian as his full-time strategic communication advisor, and there has been in being for some time a very senior advisory organization called the Strategic Communication Integration Group which purports to manage the message emanating from the building. The Air Force, for its part, has established a two-star position as Director of Strategic Communication and the other services seemed poised to follow suit. Still the Department of Defense suffers from a lack of a national message into which all of this good work will fit.

The Plan

What follows then is a straw-man strategic communication campaign plan for combating weapons of mass destruction. It does not cover every region of the world, nor does it incorporate every possible thought on combating WMD. What it *does* provide is a guide for developing additional region-specific parts of a national plan and detailed thoughts on carrying out the plan. Perhaps most importantly, the plan decisively places strategic communication and combating WMD together in the same debate as we move forward on both fronts.

The United States Can Do Better

Using the term *strategic communication* with most knowledgeable audiences today engenders an enthusiastic response. Adding *combating weapons of mass destruction* to the discussion almost invariably produces the reaction that such a marriage is absolutely necessary, but those that react are a bit vague on how to go about it. We at the USAF Counterproliferation Center believe this campaign plan will help in that regard. As we address audiences around the country, it is clear that there is much more to be done, not the least of which is continued advocacy for this underused tool.

The United States is the greatest, most powerful, and most capable democracy the world has ever known – with corresponding leadership responsibilities, particularly in the realm of preventing and combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As long as the image of the United States is clouded and its message unclear, those responsibilities will be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. A strategic communication campaign properly paired with policy development will start to lift that cloud. Nothing less than total commitment to the development of a coherent national message that pervades every action the United States takes will suffice. We at the USAF Counterproliferation Center want to help.

Toward a National Counterproliferation Strategic Communication Plan

An Input to the Interagency Process to Help Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats

1.1. Introduction.

1.2. Purpose. The purpose of this strategic communication plan is to provide a guide to the establishment of a comprehensive U.S. interagency strategic communication plan to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This plan should include the identification of goals, audiences, and resonant approaches, as well as potential international contributors, multi-media tools, means, and mechanisms to coordinate U.S. efforts through the positive shaping of targeted audience perceptions and behavior.

1.3. Statement of the Problem.

1.3.1. One of the greatest security threats facing the U.S., as well as the rest of the world, is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) to hostile or nonsecure states and terrorists. Those who can imagine – those who condone – using airplanes to ram skyscrapers, or using suicide bombers to demolish a commuter train, likely will not hesitate to use weapons of greater destructive and psychological power to achieve their objectives should such weapons come into their possession.

1.3.2. The U.S. cannot win the battle against the proliferation of WMD by itself. All nations must contribute to the effort for success to be achieved and sustained. This requires convincing not only countries that are friendly to the U.S. to support global counter-WMD actions, but also convincing nations that are hostile to the U.S. or its allies that stopping the proliferation of WMD is in their national interest also.

1.3.3. Strategic communication (SC) is one of the critical tools available in the struggle to combat proliferation of WMD. While the components of SC have been around for years, as a discipline or tool of the U.S. Government (USG) it is relatively new, and one which neither the USG nor the Department of Defense (DoD) yet conducts effectively.

1.3.4. Changing the perceptions and behaviors of other people requires influencing them in some manner, whether that be a positive influence or a negative one – the proverbial “carrots and sticks.” Influence can be achieved by many means, physical threats and emotional appeals being but two possibilities. But to achieve influence, the party that is intent upon doing the influencing must be able to reach the intended audience. The communicator must be heard. For many audiences throughout the world, messages from the U.S. will be ignored, due not to the

message itself, but from whom it comes. This makes it even more incumbent upon the U.S. Government to work with other nations and groups who can communicate effectively with those audiences the U.S. cannot reach.

1.4. Strategic Communication Definitions.

1.4.1. National Security Council (NSC) SC Definition. The integration of statecraft, Public Affairs (PA), Public Diplomacy (PD), Military Information Operations (IO) and other activities, reinforced by political, economic, and military actions, in a synchronized and coordinated manner to shape foreign perceptions and behavior.

1.4.2. Department of Defense (DoD) SC Definition. Focused U.S. Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.

1.5. Scope. This plan provides broad guidance at the global strategic level for developing an effective strategic communication plan to support the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It identifies overarching goals, objectives, themes, messages, and synchronization activities. It is designed for USG agencies to use as a guide to further refine and develop their own broad strategic communication plans in support of the national effort and as a template for developing more detailed plans for regions, countries and non-state actors.

2.1. Goals and Objectives.

2.2. Strategic Goal. The overarching strategic goal in combating WMD proliferation is two-fold: (1) To stop the transfer of WMD, their delivery systems, and related material to/from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern; and (2) to create an international environment inhospitable to proliferators. It is important to note that these are goals, not endstates. There is no true endstate in combating WMD proliferation, as it will take continual effort by the U.S. and the world to sustain the goals once they are achieved.

2.3. Supporting Strategic Communication Objectives.

2.3.1. To dissuade countries which do not have WMD from obtaining them.

2.3.2. To deter countries which have WMD, delivery systems, or related technologies, expertise, and materials, from sharing, selling, or otherwise disseminating them or from further vertical proliferation. Achieving this objective must be balanced between what's allowed under treaties, such as building a nuclear generator or nuclear power plant for developmental, environmental, or economic reasons (e.g., to reduce oil dependency), and preventing countries of concern from obtaining technology that can easily be turned into WMD development.

2.3.3. To gain the active participation from all nations in combating the proliferation of WMD, including adherence to relevant treaties and international agreements, and participation in international efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

2.3.4. To persuade countries which have fissile materials to reduce their stocks and to ensure that countries which do have WMD or related technologies and materials maintain proper accountability and security of the weapons, technologies, and materials. This includes permitting independent international inspections of storage facilities, as well as nuclear reactors.

2.3.5. To discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium and minimize the use of highly-enriched uranium.

2.3.6. To encourage increased international collaboration to develop recycle and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.

3.1. Strategic Communication Process and Components. Strategic communication itself is a *process*, not a product. The output of the process may be a product, but at the national level a strategic communication product developed outside the process will be less than effective – if not counterproductive – in the battle against WMD proliferation if it is not the result of an integrating process at the national level that focuses the synchronization of all elements of national power towards achieving the strategic goals of WMD counterproliferation. This section provides general guidance regarding the SC process and the components of an SC strategy.

3.2. The Strategic Communication Process.

3.1.1 Effective strategic communication requires a sophisticated process that identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on “doable tasks,” develops themes and messages, maps perceptions and influence networks, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. The approach must build on in-depth knowledge of foreign cultures and the factors that motivate human behavior. It must adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind sets of “winners and losers.”

3.2.2. The SC process uses synchronized, integrated information and activities to educate and inform target audiences in order to influence their behaviors and shape their perceptions. The products resulting from the SC process induce target audiences to do something the communicator wants them to do, so that the communicator achieves a desired outcome: in this case, stopping the proliferation of WMD.

3.2.3. Building a strategic communication process requires bringing together the nation’s leaders, who identify the strategic communication objectives, and the experts who can assess the information environment, identify and analyze the target audiences, devise the strategy for reaching these audiences, craft the correct messages, identify the best methods of message delivery, direct the delivery, and then, after the message is delivered, assess the impact on the

nation's desired outcome or objective.

3.2.4. As a basic rule, the more specific are the desired outcome, audience and behavior, the more effective the communication plan can be. At the national strategic level specificity is difficult to achieve. It is in the SC supporting plans of the USG Departments and Agencies and their subordinates' supporting plans that the necessary specificity must be developed.

3.2.5. At the national level, every action taken and every word spoken sends a message to the global audience, whether one was intended or not. SC impact must be the first consideration prior to any action being taken or any policy or speech drafted. What would be the impact on national and international policy goals and objectives? What does the action or policy say about the U.S. and its intentions? What do we expect will happen when the message of the action, policy or speech is heard by global audiences? SC is a fundamental responsibility of the nation's leadership.

3.2.6. The SC process is a continual cycle. It is driven by leadership decisions on the three key elements why, who, and what: our goals and objectives, who we are trying to affect, and what we want them to do. But the SC process is also constantly evolving based upon bottom-up feedback. At the national level, the SC process also requires continual policy review, especially for those policies formulated prior to new SC goals and objectives. For example, "regime change" language in national security policies can be counterproductive as a message to combat WMD proliferation, as many countries may perceive that as an intent to invade for which their only solution is the threat of nuclear retaliation. "Regime change" language could be taken out of national policy without removing the flexibility to use military action whenever national leaders deem it necessary.

3.2.7. In today's global information world, SC for WMD counterproliferation cannot stand alone. It must be integrated and balanced with other SC programs supporting other national interest, goals, and objectives. Integration is critical to identifying expected conflicts between some national objectives and developing means to mitigate the apparent dichotomy. For example, in some cases it may be more in our national interest to remain on good terms with a specific country by providing economic development support than it would be to impose sanctions for violating a tenet of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. An effective SC process identifies such competing interests so that the national leadership can make informed decisions and plan appropriate responses to the inevitable cries of favoritism or hypocrisy.

3.3. Strategic Communication Components.

3.2.1. The basic components of an SC strategy answer the fundamental questions of who, what, why, when, and how:

- WHAT are we trying to achieve? WHY?
- WHO can help us achieve this? WHO is stopping us from achieving this?
- WHAT do we want to communicate to them?
- HOW can we reach them?

- WHO else can help us reach them?
- WHAT do we want them to actually do?
- WHAT attitude or behavior do we expect?
- WHEN will this be done?
- HOW much will it cost?
- HOW will we measure success?

3.2.2. One key component of SC is *time*. Shaping perceptions and changing human behavior takes time. Achieving SC objectives may take weeks, months, or decades – all while still adroitly managing the 24-hour news cycle. Repetition and consistency of message over time are essential.

3.2.3. Development and dissemination of coordinated SC guidance and plans throughout the interagency structure is also an essential component, in order to ensure everyone understands their roles and responsibilities and how their actions affect achievement of national objectives.

3.2.4. Another key component is mapping perceptions and influence networks, and conducting social network analyses of identified key communicators within the target audience. Utilizing regional, cultural, and subject matter experts (e.g., social anthropologists) throughout the SC process is also essential. Mapping perceptions and networks combined with regional and expertise enhances the selection of the *right* messengers with the *right* message at the *right* time.

3.2.5. Regional experts are also essential to understanding the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior. What language, symbols, and images resonate with the target audience? What constitutes “message authority”? How are messages “heard” in different cultural environments?

3.2.6. Establishing metrics to evaluate success is also key to a successful SC strategy. This is normally done via Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). MOPs gauge accomplishment of SC tasks and actions (e.g., number of pamphlets on WMD counterproliferation delivered to U.S. embassies in a region). MOEs determine whether SC actions are having the desired effect toward the attainment of goals and objectives (e.g., the number of times the Ambassador from Uzbekistan voted in the UN to support WMD counterproliferation actions). MOPs measure friendly SC *effort* while MOEs measure SC *results*.

3.2.7. Analysis of media trends and influences on target audiences is an important component of SC. This entails identifying daily influences on audiences; content analysis, agenda and biases; relevance and credibility of media sources; and the structure and control of the media in a country or region. It also involves conducting or finding audience opinion polling and analyses in the target area.

3.2.8. Phasing and prioritization of effort are also key to SC. Different goals and objectives may have greater or lesser importance over time. Windows of opportunity for a message to be effective or an audience to be reached may be time dependent. SC supporting

WMD counterproliferation must be integrated with SC for other national objectives – sometimes it will be preeminent, sometimes another national interest will have priority. Phasing and prioritizing effort also enables synchronization of messages and activities for maximum effect.

3.2.9. The final component of SC is identification of required resources and capabilities. Regarding the latter, it is particularly important to identify those SC capabilities needed which are currently nonexistent or insufficient in quantity to perform the desired actions. Identification of resources includes the sources and types of resources and investments needed, and where resources and investments should be targeted based on balancing risk with costs.

4.1. Roles and Responsibilities. The sections below explain the roles and tasks of the key participants in the national effort to combat WMD.

4.2. White House and National Security Council (NSC). The White House, supported by the National Security Council, leads the USG effort for combating the WMD threat. Ideally, the White House should establish national SC policy, and provide national level SC guidance, themes, messages, goals, and objectives. This is currently the responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The White House directs the Cabinet Departments to conduct SC supporting plan development and execution. The National Security Council coordinates the USG interagency effort for SC in support of WMD counterproliferation, not just within the Executive Branch, but also with the Legislative and Justice Branches of the USG. Other key SC tasks include:

- Through cooperative activities with international partners, create an international environment inhospitable to WMD proliferators, including eliminating proliferation havens and ending state-sponsorship or support of proliferation.
- Dissuade proliferators from supplying proliferants.
- Induce proliferant states to end their WMD and missile programs.
- Continue to build coalitions and seek increased support, cooperation, and participation in nonproliferation and threat reduction programs.
- Better align and synchronize all instruments of U.S. national power with international partners' efforts.
- Coordinate policy development and review with Legislative and Justice Branches to gain their understanding, cooperation and support.
- Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, PSI, and GICNT.
- Establish and maintain international standards of accountability for WMD technology and materials.
- Strengthen and maintain international capabilities to interdict and disrupt proliferation.

4.3. State Department. The U.S. State Department is responsible for conducting and leading all diplomatic, public diplomacy, and international public information program endeavors in support of U.S. goals and objectives for countering the WMD threat. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs chairs the Policy Coordinating Committee on Public Diplomacy (PD) and SC, and is responsible for developing and

implementing the U.S. national strategy for PD and SC. Other key SC tasks for the State Department include:

- Actively employ diplomatic approaches in bilateral and multilateral settings in pursuit of nonproliferation goals.
- Enhance existing nonproliferation and arms control regimes.
- Build and sustain coalitions and seek increased support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs.
- Strengthen international support for and active participation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, PSI, GICNT, and other international nonproliferation efforts.
- Utilize diplomatic outreach to attract new countries to the extant list of nonproliferation supporters.
- Increase support for counter WMD efforts among public opinion makers and publics in participant and prospective participant states.
- Encourage increased allied political engagement in NPT, PSI, and GICNT activities.
- Provide guidance cables to U.S. embassies and posts on global WMD counterproliferation efforts.

4.4. Department of Defense. DoD is responsible for maintaining and increasing U.S. defensive and offensive WMD deterrence, detection, interdiction, and consequence management capabilities. DoD also executes strategic, operational, and tactical information operations and psychological operations in peacetime, crisis, and conflict against approved target audiences to disrupt adversary command and control, operations and intelligence, funding, logistics, training, and sanctuaries. Additionally, DoD conducts military support to public diplomacy, as well as information operations activities in coordination with other government agencies. Information operations include forms of deception in military operations, which must be clearly separated from public affairs – although public affairs should be cognizant of such operations to avoid compromise.³ Other key SC tasks include:

- Maintain and reinforce international perceptions and assurance of U.S. capacity and determination to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including preemption, active defenses, and consequence management preparedness.
- Act in accordance with current contingency plans (CONPLANS), in particular the full spectrum of Flexible Deterrent Options.
- Assess, track, and develop capabilities to counter adversary hostile propaganda, psychological operations, dis- and mis-information targeted against WMD counterproliferation efforts.
- Engage other PSI nations' military and defense establishments to enhance planning, preparation, authorities, willingness, capabilities, and capacity for interdiction operations.
- Inform American audiences of how the U.S. military is supporting counterproliferation efforts.
- Establish effective communications and information control to ensure free access to coalition information regarding WMD counterproliferation.

- Enhance the probability of adherence to PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles by conveying or demonstrating actions to shape the operational environment.
- Deny WMD proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequence management.
- Provide high visibility of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral WMD counterproliferation exercises.
- Display the commitment of U.S. and PSI partners to take action against proliferators through a well-publicized threat of interdiction.
- Exercise and publicize WMD crisis response consequence management capabilities.

4.5. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). DNI and the IC collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence relevant to WMD counterproliferation. DNI is responsible for ensuring that the National Counter-Proliferation Center (NCPC) is properly staffed and supported from throughout the IC. DNI ensures the IC provides critical intelligence support to policy makers, senior leaders, diplomats, warfighters, and law enforcement officers regarding WMD counterproliferation. Other key tasks include:

- Conduct special activities supporting counterproliferation efforts as directed by the President.
- Develop and maintain appropriate capabilities for these purposes, and implement those capabilities according to law and in cooperation with the Department of Defense and other agencies as appropriate.

4.6. Other Executive Branch Departments and Agencies. All Departments and Agencies have a role, within their areas of responsibility, in supporting WMD counterproliferation efforts and enhancing USG capabilities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations. In particular, the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Treasury, and Justice have direct responsibilities that affect the USG's capabilities to respond to WMD attacks, to identify and disrupt illicit trade in WMD technologies, to identify and disrupt proliferation financing, and to improve the law enforcement community's ability to respond to the WMD threat. Additionally, public statements by Cabinet level officials can have a significant impact on domestic and international perceptions of global WMD counterproliferation efforts.

5.1. Audiences. The global strategic audiences and the broad SC objectives concerning them that must be addressed to combat WMD can be divided into the broad categories detailed below. Some specific target audiences may fall into more than one of these broad categories – the United Nations (UN), for example, is both a nonproliferation supporter and an international organization. Sub-categories common to the broader international categories are provided in section 5.5.

5.2. Nonproliferation Supporters. Countries and organizations that actively support global non- and counter-proliferation efforts. The broad strategic communication objectives for this audience are to sustain the support and participation of countries and organizations which already support global efforts, to increase their level of active support, and to increase the number of countries and organizations in this category.

5.3. Proliferators. Proliferators fall into two general sub-categories: suppliers and proliferants, defined below. The SC objectives regarding proliferators are to stop or decrease their proliferating activities, to decrease the number of proliferators, and to decrease the support, whether active or passive, that others give to proliferators.

5.3.1. Suppliers. Countries and non-state actors which support proliferation or which sell technology, expertise, and materials that can lead to the development, acquisition, or production of WMD.

5.3.2. Proliferants. Countries and non-state actors who are seeking to acquire WMD and related/foundational technology and materials.

5.4. General International.

5.4.1. Uncommitted countries. Countries – and organizations – which do not formally support global nonproliferation efforts, but which are not proliferators either. The SC objectives are to encourage uncommitted countries to become formal members of global nonproliferation efforts, and to decrease passive or unintentional support provided to proliferators. Since much passive or unintentional support – such as being a haven or training ground for proliferators or terrorists, or having uncontrolled borders, making illicit transit easy – is frequently a result of weak governments and resulting poor security conditions, a key supporting sub-objective would be to strengthen weak and failed states.

5.4.2. International Organizations. This category includes the vast array of formal global and regional organizations, from the UN and all its subsidiary organizations to ASEAN and OPEC, to ICRC and WHO, to the World Bank and IMF, as well as the numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) that perform so many humanitarian works around the globe. These organizations are important sources of legitimacy for combating WMD efforts and are critical conduits to audiences that the U.S. can't reach. Most of them, if they don't already support global combating WMD efforts, are highly susceptible to appeals that non-proliferation is in the best interest of everyone. For example, the United Nations has published UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which calls upon states to “enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional, and international levels . . . and to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts . . . and to take cooperative action.”⁴ One of the most important international organizations in the fight against WMD proliferation is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which promotes the safe, secure, and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. The SC objective for these audiences is to increase their active support of combating WMD efforts, and also to better leverage their role as conduits.

5.4.3. International Public. Global public perceptions and opinions are a potent force around the world, especially in democratic countries, and will be key to achieving global counter WMD goals. The SC objective regarding the general international public is to convince

them that WMD is a threat to everyone, to persuade them to support global counter WMD activities, and to actively support or pressure their own nations' governments to formally support global counter WMD activities.

5.5. Internal U.S. Audiences. Just as the U.S. cannot succeed at reducing the WMD threat by itself, any one U.S. agency, including DoD, cannot succeed without the support and active participation by the rest of America.

5.5.1. U.S. Government. The checks and balances of the U.S. governmental system present some unique challenges to developing and executing a unified, synchronized national strategic communication program, whether for countering the WMD threat or any other national endeavor. While the President of the United States (POTUS) exercises great influence over the U.S. Legislature and the U.S. Judiciary, he ultimately cannot direct their activities nor the public statements they may make that could impact either positively or negatively on SC counterproliferation goals. Cabinet-level Departments and Agencies, while technically under the direct control of the Executive Branch, have their own agendas and significant leeway in performing their duties. The SC objective regarding the USG is to gain the willing cooperation of all Branches, Departments, and Agencies of the USG to actively support and enhance global WMD counterproliferation efforts. We categorically must convey unambiguous U.S. resolve on this issue.

5.4.1.1. U.S. Legislature. Strategic communication objectives specific to the U.S. Legislature include encouraging the Legislature to establish laws and review existing laws that support WMD counterproliferation efforts; to strengthen existing WMD-related treaties and ratify new ones; to support and enhance Congressional programs that enhance WMD counterproliferation efforts; to ensure the national budget provides necessary funding for WMD counterproliferation efforts, particularly the NCPC, PSI, and GICNT, as well as relevant technologies to improve interdiction capabilities; and to follow – or at least consider – national SC guidance for combating WMD proliferation prior to making public statements that could have a significant impact on domestic and international perceptions of global WMD counterproliferation efforts.

5.4.1.2. U.S. Judiciary. The SC objective for the U.S. Judiciary would be to encourage the Judiciary to expeditiously handle legal matters pertaining to WMD counterproliferation, including federal prosecution of terrorists and criminal acts that support WMD proliferation.

5.5.2. Domestic Public. U.S. public support is crucial to the USG's efforts in countering the WMD threat, especially when direct action must be taken to neutralize a threat or seize materials. Department and Agency Public Affairs offices will normally have the lead in communicating combating WMD messages to the U.S. public, but their communications must be coordinated and synchronized with everyone involved in combating WMD. No press statements or releases in this age are truly domestic anymore – they will be picked up and distributed globally by the international media. Therefore, any messages directed to the U.S. public must still be consistent with other strategic communication messages and activities conducted by the USG and allies. The SC objective with the U.S. domestic public is to increase public awareness

and education on the WMD threat, and to gain and sustain their support for the actions that the Executive, Legislative, and Justice Branches must take to ensure the U.S.'s security against the WMD threat.

5.6. Common Sub-Category Audiences. Each of the broad audiences discussed above needs to be further sub-divided into more specific audiences for better targeted message development. Sub-category audiences common to most include:

- Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, Chiefs of Defense, Economic and Trade Ministers, Parliaments
- Intelligence Community
- Defense and Trade facilitation industry (e.g., arms suppliers, air and sea carriers, port operators, insurers)
- General and specific populaces (e.g., an endemic ethnic group) in a region or country
- International, regional and country-specific media – all forms, including print, radio, television and Internet
- Non-governmental elites (e.g., academics, authors, respected journalists, and other intellectuals)
- NGOs and PVOs operating in the region or country
- Health professionals
- Selected victims, advocates, voices, enablers (e.g., exploiting Chernobyl)
- Civic and religious leaders
- Private sector leadership

6.1. Themes and Messages. Until the United States restores its credibility and positive image in the international community, themes and messages of any description will fall on deaf ears. This restoration should be priority one for any national strategic communication plan, and will almost certainly require years, if not decades of confidence-building. Without this precondition, the conveyance of more narrow combating WMD messages is suspect at best. Below are the broad themes and messages supporting the top three key strategic communication objectives. Note that “message” does not imply only printed, oral, or video text and presentations delivered by a person. Messages can also be imparted via actions. Moving a carrier battle group off a country’s coast sends a message, as does imposing or lifting a trade sanction. It is critical that actions be synchronized within an SC plan, as actions usually “speak louder than words.”

6.2. Deter and dissuade countries from proliferating.

6.2.1. Support to proliferants will not be tolerated. There will be military, political and economic consequences.

- PSI proves that the international community will not allow proliferation.
- The global participation in PSI and in related exercises underscores a growing international commitment.
- Supporting proliferation makes you a justifiable military target.
- Proliferation activities prevent the full spectrum of normal interactions, as well as reduce the possibility of reaching international legitimacy and status.

- Gaining the respect and support of the international community depends on complying with international law, UN Security Council Resolutions, and other WMD-related conventions.
- Economic development and international assistance depend on not supporting proliferation.

6.2.2. Proliferator suppliers will be held accountable.

- A WMD attack by another country or a terrorist organization to which you have sold or provided WMD technologies or materials will be treated as an attack by you. You may be subject to a full, overwhelming and devastating response.
- PSI partners have the technology to trace fissile materials back to their origin.
- PSI partners are developing new technologies to quickly detect, track, analyze, and facilitate interdiction of WMD.

6.3. Deter and Dissuade Countries from acquiring WMD.

6.3.1. Devalue adversary WMD and missiles.

- We have effective means of detection, interdiction, and defense against WMD.
- WMD capability will not bring you glory or the power to coerce.
- Actual use of a WMD weapon would cause an overwhelming, devastating response from around the world. You would be a pariah nation that no one will help.
- We can find and destroy WMD whenever we want to. PSI partners are developing new technologies to quickly detect, track, analyze, and facilitate interdiction of WMD.
- First-strike forces are destabilizing. All WMD forces must be second-strike forces or they invite preemption. This is a difficult proposition for any but a first-world power.

6.3.2. Acquisition of WMD is detrimental to your interests.

- Acquisition increases the probability of being attacked rather than decreases it. You will become an internationally recognized military target.
- WMD acquisition could pit you against the world's superpower. It is not in your interests to make an enemy of the United States.
- If you pursue WMD, so will your neighbors, thus making your country less secure.
- WMD possession draws the interests of terrorists and criminals in search of weapons.
- Pursuing WMD acquisition causes suspicion and distrust regarding true motives, thereby decreasing cooperation, trade, and investments from other countries.
- Acquisition will invite severe sanctions and other consequences that will affect domestic conditions and undermine political stability.
- Developing and building WMD is extremely expensive. WMD development will divert fiscal resources from pressing economic concerns.

- Testing, transporting, storage, and security of WMD weapons and materials is complicated, hazardous, expensive, and resource intensive.
- WMD requires very secure C4I capability – expensive and technically difficult.

6.3.3. Not pursuing WMD will advance your national interests.

- Prosperity depends on regional cooperation, not confrontation.
- Stopping pursuit of WMD and voluntarily submitting to independent international verification inspections will open doors to political and economic development support and to enhanced standing in the world.
- There are other means and solutions to achieving international clout than going down the dubious, hazardous path of WMD acquisition.
- Global corporations are far more likely to invest in countries that are not pursuing WMD.
- Joining other defense arrangements, including existing nuclear protection umbrellas will be more effective in deterring perceived threats, will gain you greater respect, and will be far less of a drain on your national resources.
- Other weapon systems are more suitable to specific countries' needs and more effective in deterring perceived threats.
- The international arms control treaties, particularly the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are important to your national interests. Proliferation undermines them.
- The United States and others likely will provide you with security guarantees if you abandon pursuit of WMD.

6.3.4. WMD and related material proliferation will be prevented, defeated, or reversed.

- PSI partners will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.
- PSI proves that the international community will not allow proliferation.
- The global participation in PSI and in related exercises underscores a growing international commitment to stop proliferation.
- PSI partners are developing new technologies to quickly detect, track, analyze, and facilitate interdiction of WMD.

6.3.5. The United States Government reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force, with all options and means available of all elements of our national power, to the use of WMD against the U.S., our forces abroad, and our allies and friends.

6.4. Gain the Active Support from All Nations to Combat WMD Proliferation.

6.4.1. WMD is not just a threat to the U.S., but to every nation, to everyone, around the world.

- WMD is a real, acknowledged threat. Even “small” yield weapons can have a devastating, disruptive impact.

- Every nation and international organization needs to work together to reduce the WMD threat.
- Effective multilateral diplomacy is important.
- Regional and global security will not be possible without everyone's active support.
- It is in our interest to work together to defeat WMD proliferation.
- Iran and North Korea are real threats that everyone should worry about.
- The U.S. will work closely with like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive strategy.
- Sanctions and other remedies can be valuable components of an overall strategy.
- Rewards and enticements to divest WMD capabilities or to stop proliferating are also key components.

6.4.2. The United States is your ally and is a reliable and trusted custodian of nuclear weapons.

- The accusation is the only country to ever use nuclear weapons is true but hollow. The first use of nuclear weapons, while horrible on its face, was done in the interest of world peace to subdue a ruthless aggressor, saving perhaps millions of lives. Further, the magnitude of destruction using these two quite small atomic weapons, fixed in the world's mind forever the resolve to never use the much larger weapons developed later.
- Possession of nuclear weapons arguably kept war at bay for the fifty years following World War II – unlike during the first half of the twentieth century.
- The reason that you cannot have nuclear weapons while the United States can, is that your behavior is inimical to world interests. We are on a different moral plane from rogue states.
- Reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States to a point where we do not offer a satisfactory deterrent, may cause our allies – who rely on our deterrent – to elevate their stockpiles.
- Reducing our numbers could leave us defenseless in the face of a revanchist Russia.
- Reliance on precision guided conventional munitions, while quite effective in many applications, is no replacement for nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
- Given that some nuclear weapons will always be extant, taking emphasis off of our nuclear posture could actually make a nuclear event more likely. The recent Minot-Barksdale transfer incident is a case in point.

6.3.2. Combating WMD promotes global security and prosperity.

- Civil society and economic security/development are potential WMD targets.
- WMD proliferation affects global trade, markets, and investments – that could affect some nations more than others (e.g., your nation may suffer more).

6.3.3. The greatest threat to the world today is terrorists using nuclear weapons.

- The threat of terrorism with nuclear weapons is real, urgent and at our doorstep.

- Nuclear terrorism and proliferation is a global threat that requires a global response.
- Terrorists have already demonstrated their desire and intent to use means and weapons that can inflict the maximum human, financial and psychological costs.

6.3.4. The protection of WMD technology, expertise and materials is essential.

- All nations need to join the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD to ensure the security and safety of existing WMD.

7.1. Conduit and Calendar Exploitation.

7.2. Conduits and Venues for Message Delivery.

7.2.1. Every interaction between a USG official and a foreign audience should be examined as an opportunity to communicate messages that support WMD counterproliferation goals, even if the subject of the engagement is not directly related to WMD counterproliferation. Every interaction between a senior USG official and the media or the U.S. public are potential means of communicating messages.

7.2.2. Many audiences around the world today have perceptions of the U.S. that are so negative that a message delivered by a U.S. messenger will be disbelieved, ignored, or will even illicit the opposite behavior or perception from that intended. The USG must seek out conduits throughout the world whose delivery of the message will have greater resonance with the intended targets. This could be our allies, friends, or even those states or organizations with which we are not normally on good terms, but which may support WMD counterproliferation efforts.

7.2.3. International organizations, NGOs, and PVOs can be key conduits for messages, especially to populations that are hostile to the U.S.

7.2.4. Embassy personnel, including the defense attachés, are key conduits every time they meet with representatives of the host nation. They can also assess the resonance and reactions of messages amongst the various audiences within the host nation.

7.2.5. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) oversees significant capabilities for disseminating messages to a wide variety of audiences around the world. The BBG was formed in 1999 as the independent federal agency responsible for all U.S. government and government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting. While the “Broadcasting Board of Governors” is the legal name given to the Federal entity encompassing all U.S international broadcasting services, the day-to-day broadcasting activities are carried out by the individual BBG international broadcasters: the Voice of America (VOA), Alhurra, Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Radio and TV Martí, with the assistance of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB).⁵

7.2.6. Events for potential exploitation include, but are not limited to:

- President/Vice President speeches, press conferences, travel/visits, Head of State visits, discussions, and calls.
- White House Global Messenger, Fact of the Day, and other printed product releases.
- Secretary/Deputy, Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary speeches, statements, press events, counterpart calls, travel/visits, and testimony.
- Counterpart discussions about allied political, economic, counterproliferation, arms control, military, or strategic communication coordination, assistance, and support.
- Major U.S. and Allied military exercises, especially those that exercise WMD interdiction capabilities.
- NSC Policy Coordinating Committee meetings.
- Cabinet and Principals/Deputies meetings.
- Preparation and release of major USG reports (states that sponsor terrorism, etc.)
- Congressional Delegations (CODELs) and visits to foreign countries by desk officers, office directors or other USG employees.
- UN and other major international organization (e.g., NATO, ASEAN, OPEC) conferences and significant anniversaries.
- Significant national historical anniversaries and major holidays.
- Major media events, including press receptions, conferences, roundtables, text and video releases, including commercial television and film industry broadcasts and releases.
- Interviews, speeches, speaker programs, panel discussions, and film releases on subjects relating to WMD proliferation.
- Publications, Exhibits & Educational Displays on technologies, materials, or expertise related to WMD.
- U.S. military officer attendance at foreign military education courses.
- International Military Education & Training (IMET) Program
- International Visitor Program

7.3. Identified Calendar Events for Exploitation. Once appropriate conduits and venues have been identified, key events for exploitation should be placed on a tracking calendar (see Annex A), along with the recommendations for actions to take to best exploit the communication opportunity.

Annex A – Representative Calendar Exploitation Plan.

A.1. This annex provides a hypothetical year-long calendar of international engagements and opportunities for SC exploitation with recommendations on how best to achieve maximum effects.

A.2. These are representative events. A full engagement calendar would include key dates and events from the UN, NATO, NPT, G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Nunn-Lugar Program, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Combatant Commands, and many other organizations. A true event calendar action plan is a living document where key dates must be added, integrated and continuously updated to ensure currency, the maximum number of reinforcing venues, and sufficient planning time to ensure execution. Each USG agency with a direct role in conducting WMD counterproliferation activities must maintain its own detailed Counterproliferation SC Calendar and share it with other agencies.

A.3. Counterproliferation Events Calendar.

January 20XX

PSI Operational Experts Group Meeting, Uzbekistan.

Recommended actions:

- Ensure agenda includes reports and discussion on status of information and communications efforts by PSI countries.
- Prepare press kit and make available to embassy Public Affairs officers in the region.

Air/Ground Interdiction Exercise (Australia – Pacific Ocean).

Recommended actions:

- Australian FM and CHOD kick off the exercise stressing to press resulting capability of such exercises and importance to the PSI effort.
- Encourage Australia to invite Iranian Attachés to observe and initiate exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track, and interdict WMD.
- Establish a PSI display showing global scope, participants, exercises, and technology being collectively brought to bear to prevent the proliferation of WMD.
- Embassy PA officer in New Zealand solicit op-ed article on importance on non-proliferation in Australian and New Zealander press.
- Embed media or combat camera with air and ground units participating in exercise.
- Talk with international news organizations about a feature on PSI using the exercise as centerpiece.
- Post exercise:
 - INR Media reaction focused on PSI exercise.
 - Conduct digital video conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.

China Business Summit, Beijing, China.

Recommended actions:

- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them, commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain WMD capabilities, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- DOS and CIA collaborate on and vet through ODNI a compendium of evidence of such collaboration, and threaten to distribute as well as provide to the international media in conjunction with the meeting.
- Solicit a Chinese government official to write op-ed articles about how industry can support non-proliferation.

February 20XX

Visit of the President of the Peoples Republic of China to Washington, D.C.

Recommended actions:

- POTUS personally convey U.S. concerns about China's commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain WMD capabilities, and that it permits intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires
- Vice President (VP), SecState, SecDef, and NDI emphasize reinforcing points.
- CIA provide compilation of graphic and other data regarding Iranian WMD and attempts to avoid international scrutiny.
- DOS provide a compilation of UNSCR and other arms control conventions of which Iran is a member, but is currently failing to meet obligations.
- Highlight visit in DOS' International Information Program Washington Files.
- DOS provide PSI-related documents/updates to the Chinese.
- Provide PSI Press kit to U.S. and participant embassies throughout Asia to coincide with visit.

Winter Olympics.

Recommended actions:

- Allied nations give full visibility to preparations to deal with a terrorist WMD threat, including military, intelligence, financial, law enforcement, political, and cyber cooperation. Must, however, continue to emphasize the threat posed by WMD, proliferant countries, their supporters and terrorists. Highly visible preparations should be advertised in the months before the Games and exercised continuously.

Paris Club Meeting (Official Creditors), Paris, France.

Recommended actions:

- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.

- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations' commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear material, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- Prepare background paper concerning the financial aspects of proliferation or any successes in interdicting financing of proliferation activities and make available to Embassy in Paris for provision to the French media.

March 20XX

NATO Crisis Management Exercise.

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourage host nation and NATO Military Committee to invite Iranian Attachés to observe the exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability to detect, track, and interdict WMD.
- Emphasize threat posed by proliferant countries and their supporters as well as terrorists.
- Establish a PSI exhibit with video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies in Europe.
- Conduct webcast interviews with participants.
- Conduct a digital video conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.
- Post exercise:
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls in Europe on PSI and WMD nonproliferation.
 - Analyze media reaction to PSI and WMD nonproliferation efforts reported before, during, and after exercise.

ABC Broadcasts a Critically Acclaimed Fictional Miniseries Depicting a Terrorist WMD Attack on the U.S.

Recommended actions:

- Develop public service announcements to be aired during the broadcasts.
- Arrange interviews between military and civilian counter terrorist and WMD counterproliferation experts and major print, radio and television journalists.
- Senior U.S. official write an op-ed piece for release in major U.S. media.

Annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial, Taegu, South Korea.

Recommended actions:

- POTUS personally convey to participating Heads of State U.S. concerns about regional countries' (e.g., China and the DPRK) commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain WMD capabilities, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- VP, SecState, SecDef, NDI, and National Security Advisor emphasize similar reinforcing points to their respective counterparts.
- DOS provide talking points in advance to participating nations about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict.

- U.S. encourage ASEAN PSI partners to include talking points to their respective delegations, emphasizing the WMD threat to all countries posed by proliferant countries and those who support them, not just the United States, as well as the increased international military cooperation to interdict
- DOS provide a more articulate presentation of why we are so worried about Iran – including providing a written compilation of UN/IAEA and other resolutions and other statements of concern, statements by Iranians themselves of their intention not to comply, as well as their increasingly aggressive rhetoric, graphics and other data regarding Iranian WMD and attempts to avoid international scrutiny.
- U.S. encourage Australia to call for a PSI media event for Ministers.

OAS Meeting of the Inter-American Committee on Ports, Maracaibo, Venezuela.

Recommended actions:

- Provide OAS mission and region's embassy PA officers with:
 - PSI success stories focused on South America/Caribbean region, via Washington Files and other means.
 - Press kit addressing assessment of South American/Caribbean proliferators and any association of proliferation to drug trafficking.
- Arrange selected South American media interviews with meeting participants about maritime PSI efforts.
- Arrange Voice of America (VOA) interviews with select meeting participants.

April 20XX

United Nations General Assembly, New York, U.S.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background papers to be distributed by PSI partners on WMD concerns and the threat they constitute to international peace and commerce.
- U.S. prepare a compendium of evidence of international political, financial, intelligence, and military cooperation and collaboration.
- Press release tying the anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the prevention of proliferation of WMD as a vital mission of the UN.
- President Bush personally convey to participating heads of state U.S. concerns about regional countries commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear material, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- SECSTATE and National Security Advisor emphasize similar reinforcing points to their respective counterparts.
- DOS coordinate with selected allies to provide talking points about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict, emphasizing that this is not a unilateral effort on the part of the U.S.
- DOS provide PSI-related documents/updates.
- U.S. encourage UN PSI partners to include talking points to their respective delegations, emphasizing the WMD threat posed by proliferant countries and those who support them to

all countries, not just the United States, as well as the increased international military cooperation to interdict.

- U.S. encourage a partner to call for a PSI media event during the meetings of the General Assembly.

Maritime/Ground Interdiction Exercise (Netherlands).

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present during exercise kick off exercise stressing to media increased bilateral and multilateral capacity for interdiction, enhanced intelligence cooperation, and the global importance to the PSI effort.
- Encourage the Dutch Government to invite attendance by the Iranian Attaché.
- Establish a PSI exhibit in the port featuring video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to embassies in Europe.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships participating in the exercise.
- Talk with international news organizations about a feature on PSI using the exercise as centerpiece.
- Post exercise:
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls in Western Europe and Russia.
 - Analyze media reaction to PSI and WMD nonproliferation efforts reported before, during, and after exercise.

PSI Operational Experts Group Meeting, Senegal.

Recommended actions:

- Ensure agenda includes reports and discussion on status of information and communications efforts by PSI countries.
- Prepare press kit and make available to embassy Public Affairs officers in the region.

G-8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Forum for the Future, Manama, Bahrain.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the relationship between WMD, terrorism, and progress as well as stability in the Middle East, and provide to participants. Paper must include the financial aspects of proliferation and its societal impact.
- U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA discusses the full spectrum of exploitation with G-8, G-77, and EU3 partners.
- In coordination with selected allies, prepare relevant background papers concerning the financial aspects of proliferation.
- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.

May 20XX

APEC Finance Ministers Meeting, Jeju (Cheju-do), South Korea.

Recommended actions:

- U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.
- U.S. prepare a compendium of evidence of such collaboration and threaten to distribute as well as provide to the international media in conjunction with the meeting.

Maritime/Ground Interdiction Exercise (United Kingdom – Indian Ocean)

Recommended actions:

- Senior British and other host nation officials present at exercise locations initiate exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track and interdict WMD and encourage participant nations to invite Iranian Attachés to observe.
- Establish a PSI exhibit(s) featuring video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI. Provide PSI pamphlets to embassies in the Indian Ocean as well as elsewhere
- UK MOD, USPACOM, and PACFLT PA officers coordinate PA activities.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships and ground units participating in exercise. Talk with international news organizations about a feature on PSI using the exercise as centerpiece.
- Post exercise:
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls in Indian Ocean region.
 - INR Media reaction focused on PSI exercise.
 - Conduct digital video conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.

June 20XX

U.S./Russia WMD Destruction/Counterproliferation Exercise.

Recommended actions:

- Convey in official and sidebar discussions U.S. concerns about Russian commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues.
- Commander, U.S. European Command provide an articulate discussion of why we are so worried about Iran, as well as increased international military and intelligence capacity to track and interdict.
- DOS provide talking points in advance about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict displayed through PSI exercises.
- CIA, ONDI prepare background paper on degree of complicity by Russia.

Air/Ground Interdiction Exercise (France – Mediterranean Sea).

Recommended actions:

- Commander, USEUCOM kick off the exercise stressing to press resulting capability of such exercises and importance to the PSI effort.
- Encourage the French Government to invite attendance by the Iranian Attaché.
- Convey in official and sidebar discussions U.S. concerns about Russian commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues.

- Establish a PSI exhibit featuring video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI
- Provide PSI pamphlets to embassies in Europe.
- Embed media or combat camera with air and ground units participating in exercise.
- Talk with international news organizations about a feature on PSI using the exercise as centerpiece.
- Post exercise:
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls in selected European countries.
 - Analyze media reaction to PSI exercise and WMD nonproliferation efforts before, during, and after exercise.

July 20XX

PSI Operational Experts Group Meeting, Canada.

Recommended actions:

- Ensure agenda includes reports and discussion on status of information and communications efforts by PSI countries.
- Prepare press kit and make available to participants.

U.S.-hosted, PSI-related Air Cargo Workshop.

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourage host nation to ensure widest possible media coverage, a schedule of projected exercises stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track and interdict WMD.
- Establish a PSI exhibit with video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies in host nation.
- Conduct webcast interviews with participants and a digital video conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.

PSI Game.

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourage host nation to invite Iranian Attaché to observe and initiate exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track and interdict WMD.
- Establish a PSI exhibit in the port with video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies in the region.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships participating in exercise.
- Conduct webcast interviews with participants.
- Conduct foreign public opinion polls in the region before and after the exercise.

August 20XX

Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland.

Recommended actions:

- U.S. Ambassador encourages UN Mission to the Conference on Disarmament to include a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track, and interdict WMD.
- DOS ensures all international missions to the UN (NYC, Geneva, and elsewhere) have Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) documents, websites, participants' lists, and exercise schedules, and receive media and web-based updates.
- Joint statement/group photo made available to press by all representatives that emphasizes PSI's contribution to disarmament and international participation.
- U.S. Ambassador encourage a key PSI partner to host an exhibit and perhaps augment it intermittently with military participants in PSI exercises to augment static displays.
- U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament establish a digital video conference (interactive web) event with non-USG experts on PSI.

Singapore-hosted Maritime-Ground Interdiction Exercise, DEEP SABRE.

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourages Singapore to invite Iranian Attaché to observe, and initiates exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track and interdict WMD.
- Establish a PSI exhibit in the port with video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies in Singapore.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships participating in exercise.
- Conduct webcast interviews with participants (high internet access in Singapore.)
- Hold a digital video conference (interactive web) event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.
- Post-exercise:
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls in Singapore and Malaysia.
 - Analyze media reaction focused on PSI exercise.

U.S.-Only WMD Exercise Working Group, Northern Virginia.

Recommended actions:

- Address specifically the importance of participants strategically “messaging” Iran as an integral requirement in every PSI exercise.
- Discuss review of how allied/friendly SC/IO can become part of every PSI and CT-related exercise.

USEUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE (WMD).

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourage participants to invite Iranian Attaché to observe, and initiate exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track and interdict WMD.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies in participating countries.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships/aircraft/with forces participating in exercise
- Conduct webcast interviews with participants.

- Establish a PSI exhibit in the briefing room(s).
- Conduct digital video conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls pre-and post-exercise.
 - Analyze media reaction pre- and post-exercise.

September 20XX

Maritime Interdiction Exercise (Spain).

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourage Spain to invite Iranian Attaché to observe, and initiate exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track, and interdict WMD.
- Establish a PSI exhibit in the port with video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies in Madrid.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships participating in exercise to ensure widest possible media coverage in all participants' countries.
- Conduct webcast interviews with participants and a digital video conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.
- Post exercise:
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls.
 - Analyze media reaction focused on PSI exercise.

U.S./Russia Counterterrorist Exercise.

Recommended actions:

- SACEUR personally convey to Russian MOD and CHOD, as well as to EUCOM CHODs, IAEA and EU3 and G-8 concerns about Russia's commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain WMD capabilities and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- SACEUR personally provides PSI-related documents/updates to the Russian CHOD.
- EUCOM prepares background paper for media on impact of PSI on military and intelligence cooperation, as well as hemispheric security.

Summit of the Americas Implementation Review Group, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Recommended actions:

- POTUS personally convey to participating heads of state U.S. concerns about regional countries commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear material, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- VP, SecState, SecDef, NDI, and National Security Advisor emphasize similar reinforcing points to their respective counterparts.
- DOS provide talking points in advance to participating nations about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict.

- DOS provide a more articulate presentation of why we are so worried about Iran – including providing a written compilation of UN/IAEA and other resolutions and other statements of concern, and statements by Iranians themselves of their intention not to comply.
- U.S. encourage a Summit partner to call for a PSI media event for Ministers.
- Prepare background paper for media on impact of PSI on military and intelligence cooperation, as well as hemispheric security.

OAS Sustainable Development Ministers Meeting, Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare press kit about supporting the Renewable Energy in the Americas (REIA) initiative.
- DOS International Information Program publish a Washington Files report about the status of the REIA.
- USAID senior official prepare a press release supportive of the REIA initiative.

United Nations World Summit on the Information Society PrepCom III, Vienna.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare and provide to U.S. mission to UNVIE a press kit addressing any information (propaganda) from organizations critical of the PSI/non-proliferation efforts during conference.

NATO Informal Defense Ministers Meeting, Berlin, Germany.

Recommended actions:

- SECDEF personally conveys to counterparts IAEA and U.S. concerns about regional countries commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain WMD capabilities, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- DOS provide to SECDEF agreed talking points to distribute to participating nations about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict.
- In particular, sidebar conversations should emphasize the degree to which we are so worried about Iran – including providing a written compilation of UN/IAEA and other resolutions and other statements of concern, and statements by Iranians themselves of their intention not to comply.
- U.S. encourage NATO PSI partners to include talking points to their respective delegations, emphasizing the WMD threat posed by proliferant countries and those who support them to all countries, not just the United States, as well as the increased international military cooperation to interdict.
- CIA provide to SECDEF for distribution a compilation of graphic and other data regarding Iranian WMD and attempts to avoid international scrutiny.
- Provide PSI Press kit to U.S. and participant delegations to coincide with the forum.
- Encourage a partner to call for a PSI media event at the meeting.
- DOD prepare a background paper for the media on the impact of PSI on enhanced military and intelligence cooperation.

U.S.-Arab Economic Forum, Houston, Texas, U.S.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the financial aspects of proliferation or any successes in interdicting financing of proliferation activities and make available to U.S. embassies in participating countries for release to host nation media.
- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.
- U.S. prepare a compendium of evidence of such collaboration and threaten to distribute as well as provide to the international media in conjunction with the meeting.

DOD-Sponsored Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies Course Conducted.

Recommended actions:

- SECDEF ensure APCSS (and all other DOD-sponsored security centers) initiates a specific course designed to address the international WMD threat, PSI achievements to date, exercises, RDTE&A, and intelligence cooperation.
- DOS provide PSI-related documents/updates to the Chinese.

Annual Meeting of World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the financial aspects of proliferation or any successes in interdicting financing of proliferation activities. Make available to the media.

World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.

Recommended actions:

- DOE/DOJ officials participate in digital videoconferences and interactive webcasts concerning intellectual property rights relative to nuclear technology.
- Provide pamphlets on PSI and intellectual property rights to participating European embassies.
- U.S. officials talk with international news organizations about a feature on PSI using the meeting as centerpiece. Encourage allies to do same or participate together.
- Post exercise, conduct:
 - Foreign Public opinion poll in Europe.
 - Analysis of media reaction focused on PSI exercise.

Annual APEC CEO Roundtable, Washington, D.C., U.S.

Recommended actions:

- Produce background paper on general topic, “Why industry should support the PSI,” and provide to media in Asia.
- Solicit CEOs attending to write op-ed articles (in their respective media) about how industry can support nonproliferation.

Meeting of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive, The Hague, Netherlands.

Recommended actions:

- U.S. Ambassador convey to participants U.S. concerns about Iranian non-compliance to date as an indicator of sustained lack of cooperation in the full spectrum of WMD-related issues.

- DOS provide U.S. Ambassadors to all arms control fora talking points in advance to participating nations about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict.
- DOS provide specific points of concern about Iran, collaborate with selected international partners, and encourage them to articulate to the meeting why we should all be worried about Iran.
- DOS provide to collaborators a written compilation of UN/IAEA and other resolutions and other statements of concern, and statements by Iranians themselves of their intention not to comply.
- U.S. encourage OPCWE PSI partners to provide talking points to their respective delegations, emphasizing the WMD threat posed by proliferant countries and those who support them to all countries, not just the United States, as well as the increased international military cooperation to interdict.
- U.S. encourage a Summit partner to call for a PSI media event for Ministers.
- Prepare background paper for media on impact of PSI on military and intelligence cooperation as well as hemispheric security and press kits.
- Produce/make available to media a video on chemical weapons employments in the past to emphasize the importance of the organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

October 20XX

PSI Game (Norway)

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourage Norway to invite Iranian Attaché to observe and initiate exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track and interdict WMD.
- Establish a PSI exhibit in the port with video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships participating in exercise.
- Webcast interviews with participants and Digital Video Conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.
- Post exercise:
 - Conduct foreign public opinion polls and compare to pre-exercise ones.
 - INR Media reaction focused on PSI exercise.

Maritime Interdiction Exercise (Poland).

Recommended actions:

- Senior U.S. official present encourage Poland to invite Iranian Attaché to observe and initiate exercise with a media event stressing collective determination and capability of signatories to detect, track, and interdict WMD.
- Establish a PSI exhibit in the port with video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- Provide PSI pamphlets to all foreign embassies.

- Embed media or combat camera on ships participating in exercise
- Conduct Webcast interviews with participants and Digital Video Conference (interactive web event) with USG and non-USG experts on PSI.

PSI Operational Experts Group Meeting.

Recommended actions:

- Ensure agenda includes reports and discussion on status of information and communications efforts by PSI countries.
- Prepare press kit and make available to embassy Public Affairs officers in the region.

Ibero-American Summit, Salamanca, Spain.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the political, military, and financial aspects of proliferation or any successes in interdicting proliferation activities.
- Emphasize worst-case terrorists with WMD scenario.
- DOS, augmented by U.S. arms control ambassadors, as well as USTR and Secretary of Commerce, provide talking points in advance to use during sidebar conversations.

Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, visits Russian Far East Command.

Recommended actions:

- Convey in official and sidebar discussions U.S. concerns about commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues.
- DOS provide talking points in advance about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict displayed through PSI exercises.
- Commander, MARFORPAC provide an articulate discussion of why we are so worried about Iran, as well as increased international military and intelligence capacity to track and interdict.
- CIA and ONDI prepare background paper on degree of complicity by Russia.

UN General Assembly Disarmament and International Security Committee, New York, U.S.

Recommended actions:

- In accordance with guidance provided by UNVIE PD officer, U.S. arms control ambassadors reach consensus with selected bilateral and multilateral counterparts on the threat WMD proliferation continues to entail to international stability, the extent of allied determination to combat further proliferation, the resulting enhanced capability of PSI exercises, and the long-term importance to the international PSI effort.
- Consider establishment of a permanent PSI display at the UN in New York, updated continuously, with graphics, ballistic missile ranges from proliferants and their suppliers, displays of NPT, CWC, and all other arms control international conventions, and all past/projected PSI exercises.
- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.

- A U.S. ally in this domain issue a supporting compendium of evidence of proliferation/supplier/financial collaboration for release to national and international media.

EUCOM 8th Chiefs Of Defense Meeting.

Recommended actions:

- SACEUR convey to participants IAEA concerns about regional countries commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing NATO's determination to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear material, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- SACEUR convey NATO's determination to prevent WMD proliferation and the importance of allied cooperation in PSI at all levels.

World Trade Organization (WTO) General Council, Geneva, Switzerland.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the financial aspects of proliferation or any successes in interdicting financing of proliferation activities and make available to Embassy in Geneva for provision to the Swiss media.
- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S. and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.

November 20XX

UK-hosted Maritime-Ground Interdiction Exercise.

Recommended actions:

- Senior UK official present during exercise initiate exercise stressing to press resulting international capability and importance to preventing WMD proliferation and exposing support to proliferants.
- Coordinate embassy media engagement with GBR PA counterparts.
- Establish a PSI exhibit in the port featuring video of BBC China seizure and other accomplishments of the PSI.
- UK MOD, USEUCOM, and NAVEUR PA officers coordinate PA activities.
- Embed media or combat camera on ships participating in exercise.
- Talk with international news organizations about a feature on PSI using the exercise as centerpiece.
- Pre- and Post-Exercise:
 - Conduct public opinion polls in Europe pre- and post-exercise.
 - Analyze media reaction before, during, and after PSI exercise.

U.S.-Australia Ministerial, Australia.

Recommended actions:

- SECSTATE personally conveys to counterparts IAEA and U.S. concerns about regional countries commercial engagement with Iran on WMD-related issues, stressing his personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain WMD capabilities, and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.

- DOS provides talking points about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can do to address the WMD threat, strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict.
- In particular, sidebar conversations should emphasize the degree to which the U.S. is so worried about Iran – including providing a written compilation of UN/IAEA and other resolutions and other statements of concern, and statements by Iranians themselves of their intention not to comply.
- DOS prepares background paper for the media on the impact of PSI on enhanced military and intelligence cooperation.
- USTR and Secretary of Commerce prepare background paper and talking points about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.

Visit of President of Yemen to Washington.

Recommended actions:

- President, VP, National Security Advisor, SECSTATE and SECDEF emphasize the international threat posed by WMD proliferant countries and those who support them.

Xth Session of Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, Netherlands.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the shared political, military, economic and commercial threats posed by WMD proliferation, and specifically on that posed by Iran, including their past violations of CWC, NPT, and other conventions as well as their current refusal to cooperate.
- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.
- U.S. encourage another allied partner in the publication of a compendium of evidence of such collaboration and threaten to distribute as well as provide to the international media in conjunction with the meeting. Papers should show a pattern of non-compliance.

G-8 Lyon-Roma Anti-Crime and Terrorism Meeting, London, England.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the relationship between terrorism and WMD as well as the financial aspects of proliferation for attendees.
- Consider making available via UK FCO and MOD to the media.
- U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA discuss with EU3 and key allied counterparts participation as well as documentary provision to the meeting.

APEC Joint Ministerial, Pusan, South Korea.

Recommended actions:

- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide updated talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about political, economic, commercial and military collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.

- U.S. prepare an updated compendium of evidence of such collaboration.
- A selected ally propose to distribute as well as provide to the international media in conjunction with the meeting.

APEC Economic Leaders Meeting, Pusan, South Korea.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare background paper concerning the financial aspects of proliferation or any successes in interdicting financing of proliferation activities and make available to Embassy, Seoul for provision to the media.
- USTR and Secretary of Commerce provide talking points in advance to participating nations about IAEA, U.S., and other international concerns about financial collaboration with WMD proliferant states and those who support them.
- U.S. collaborate with Japan in the preparation of a compendium of evidence of such collaboration and threaten to distribute as well as provide to the international media in conjunction with the meeting.

Annual Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Chemical Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare updated background papers concerning the threat still posed by WMD proliferant states and their supporters as well as that posed by terrorists.
- Present progress reports on international, EU3, G-8, and G-77 advocacy.

Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies Senior Executive Course Begins.

Recommended actions:

- Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, invites the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations to address the course and discuss the threat posed by WMD to international and regional stability as well as to countering the terrorist threat, and the importance of continued PSI collaboration on WMD interdiction efforts.
- Recommend a specific block of instruction be initiated on WMD and every PSI collaborator country provide guest speakers.
- Recommend intelligence and financial coordination be emphasized, with particular attention to ensuring participants with whom Iran shares embassies have appropriate documents.
- Recommend establishment of specific course of instruction at the South East Asian Regional CT Center in Kuala Lumpur and the PACOM-encouraged center in Singapore.

December 20XX

Annual Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, Geneva, Switzerland.

Recommended actions:

- Prepare updated background papers concerning the threat still posed by WMD proliferant states and their supporters as well as that posed by terrorists.
- Present progress reports on international, EU3, G-8, and G-77 advocacy.

NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels, Belgium.

Recommended actions:

- SECSTATE conveys to counterparts U.S. and IAEA continued concerns about WMD proliferation, in particular, Iran, stressing her personal and America's national determination to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear material and allows intrusive physical monitoring IAW IAEA desires.
- Provide a written compilation of UN/IAEA and other resolutions and other statements of concern, statements by Iranians themselves of their intention not to comply.
- SECSTATE discusses with key allies before Ministerial the need for agreed talking points about what international signatories to the various nonproliferation conventions can now do to address Iran's continued intransigence, increase international perceptions of a shared WMD threat, further strengthen adherence to the conventions, and enhance our collective capability to interdict as a deterrent/dissuasion technique.
- SECSTATE encourages NATO PSI partners to include talking points to their respective delegations, emphasizing the WMD threat posed by proliferant countries and those who support them to all countries, not just the United States, as well as the increased international military cooperation to interdict.

Annex B – Islamic Republic of Iran: Heading Down a Dangerous Path.

B.1. Background.

B.1.1. Iran has continued to claim that they are well within their international rights, allowed under Article IV of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to have centrifuges that produce material for nuclear reactors. However, those very centrifuges can be rapidly re-engineered to produce higher percentages of enriched weapons-grade uranium (90% or better). For this reason, many analysts are skeptical about Iranian intentions. Further, aside from the immediate threat posed by the enriched uranium, the international nonproliferation regime suffers when such demonstrably creative interpretations of the NPT are allowed to flourish.



Figure B1. An Iranian technician moves a piece of equipment inside the Bushehr nuclear power plant in 2005.

B.1.2. In the midst of possible United Nations sanctions and European pressure to stop enrichment, Iran remains defiant. “We will first have to break the horn of the big head so that justice can be done,” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said.⁶ Translated, the expression means that they must blunt arrogant behavior – in this case, meaning U.S. behavior.

B.1.3. Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric remains belligerent and his government seems to relish America’s ongoing problems with Iraq. However, the leadership structure of Iran is complex and at times fractured, and it is not clear that Ahmadinejad always speaks for the entire country. Regardless of who speaks for Iran, the country’s actual nuclear intentions still remain uncertain, and it is clear that U.S. interests are better served if Iran does not possess, or is dissuaded from developing, nuclear weapon capabilities.

B.2. The Requirement.

B.2.1. The strategic communication requirement is two-fold. First, if Iran has enriched uranium but is not currently pursuing a nuclear weapons program – as the latest National Intelligence Estimate indicates – then it is incumbent on the U.S. to persuade and ultimately convince the Iranians that if it were to change that policy and pursue nuclear weapons:

- Iran is less safe with WMD than without it – and without it faces less of a threat from the United States. But it is overly simplistic to base Iran’s nuclear intentions on countering the power of the United States, although such a policy is certainly part of the leadership’s thinking. The Iranian decision calculus is also based on other regional issues such as prestige, a potentially resurgent Iraq, nuclear-armed Pakistan and India,

Israel and other Middle East tensions. All of these factors must be addressed in any strategic communication plan.

- The region will be more stable, and therefore more conducive to economic investment and expansion if Iran does not develop nuclear weapons capability.
- Iranian global prestige and regional leadership will be bolstered if they don't pursue.
- The U.S. does not object to nuclear energy.

B.2.2. Second, the U.S. must enlist the help of all its allies, friends, and international organizations to persuade Iran that it is in their best interest not to continue nuclear proliferation. The U.S. must:

- Ensure that the European Union – 3 (EU3: United Kingdom, Germany, France) clearly understands the U.S. position and is aligned with U.S. diplomatic strategies.
- Continue confidence-building measures in Arab and Muslim and assure them that the likelihood of further use of regime change to alter the balance of regional power is remote (e.g., engaging diplomatically with Syria).
- Encourage China and Russia to participate in convincing the Iranians that they are less safe with nuclear weapons than without them.
- Participate, encourage, and stimulate international organizations to leverage their influence towards non-proliferation.

B.3. *Premise and Components.* Given our experience with Iraq and diminishing U.S. World opinion, non-US key communicators will often have better resonance on the Iranian nuclear issue. As such, the plan must incorporate allied collaboration and conduits to ensure success:

- Immediately begin a selective political engagement process with Iran; with the long-term goal of reinstatement of full diplomatic relations.
- Take advantage of specific of events included in the aforementioned calendar for exploitation.
- Use all multimedia conduits to express the U.S. position with regards to Iran.
- Leverage U.S. bilateral/multilateral communication efforts with the EU3 to target Iran and its suppliers - Russia, China, North Korea.
- Begin immediate U.S.-Russia bilateral engagements, including engagement by U.S. European Command.
- Increase emphasis of Iran-specific DoD reinforcement of the Proliferation Security Initiative with greater visibility of deterrent/dissuasion/interdiction capabilities.
- Conduct a reinforcement exercise via current Coalition Maritime Intercept Operations in the Arabian Gulf.
- Conduct other activities, at a classification above Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU), including Computer Network Operations (CNO).

B.4. *Participants and Conduits.*

- Governments (e.g., France, Germany, United Kingdom, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Australia, Japan, New Zealand)
- International organizations (e.g., IAEA, UN, EU, Arab League, OPEC, WTO)
- Proliferation Security Initiative members
- Nonproliferation and roll-back regimes (e.g., Japan, Republic of Korea/Libya, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus)
- Signatories to all WMD conventions
- Military conduits
- Commercial entities
- Academics
- All source media and cyber
- NGOs
- Surrogates
- Special interlocutors

B.5. Target Audiences.

- Iranian Leadership*
- Iranian population, and more importantly their youth
- Proliferation suppliers (e.g., WMD components and precursors)
- Allies and friends
 - Regional influencers
- International organizations (The Nuclear Suppliers Group)




Figure B2. An example of regional SNA.

Source: Army Survey, Booz Allen analysis

Note: a detailed breakdown of target audiences is required by country/cultural experts. Social Network Analysis (SNA) provides a methodology for providing these key communicators and receptors (see Figure B2).

B.6. Requirements.

- Dedicated Policy and Coordination Committee (PCC) to ensure planning and execution of the SC strategy. Includes oversight of:
 - Objectives
 - Guidance
 - Limitations
 - Coordinating interaction
 - Timing constraints
- SC coordination mechanisms:
 - Immediately begin a selective political engagement process with Tehran.

* Leadership structure in Iran is complex. No attempt to influence the leadership should be made without a thorough knowledge of the inner workings of the Iranian government, along with assistance from regional experts.

- Send envoys to key allies and friends/communicators/interlocutors in each target country and at each international organization.
- Broaden Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) agenda focused on non-proliferation.
- Reassure Iraqi leadership that diplomatic relations with Iran does not mean Sunnis are no longer important to Iraq's future.

B.7. Themes and Messages. Note that to achieve maximum resonance, most of these would best be conveyed by non-U.S. communicators.

B.7.1. Iran Itself.

- Iran and the U.S. can peacefully co-exist; the U.S. recognizes the right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to exist.
- The U.S. is not opposed to nuclear energy, and can assist Iran in that endeavor (e.g., purchase fuel at reasonable market rates for nuclear power reactor).
- Tehran must demonstrate tangible cooperation with the IAEA inspection process or face multilateral economic and political sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.
- The U.S. and its allies continue to advance their robust active and passive defenses against WMD.
- If Iran continues their belligerent ways, the U.S. does not rule out any military actions to solve nuclear weapons proliferation issues.
- The United States views current Iranian support of terrorist and insurgent groups in other countries as an indicator of willingness to export WMD technology or materials, which is unacceptable to the international community.
- WMD and related material proliferation will be prevented, defeated, destroyed, or reversed.
- PSI proves that the international community will not allow proliferation. The global participation in PSI and in related exercises underscores a growing international commitment.
 - PSI partners are developing new technologies to quickly detect, track, analyze, and facilitate interdiction of WMD.
- There will be economic advantages to not pursuing WMD.
- WMD development will destabilize the region and ultimately hurt economic progress.
- WMD acquisition brings considerable negative consequences (e.g., political and economic sanctions) that will affect domestic conditions and undermine political stability.
- Iran and the United States share common interests. (e.g., stable oil supplies and prices, reducing the regional drug trade, and stopping cross-border arms and extremists from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia).

B.7.2. Iranian Suppliers.

- Support to proliferators will not be tolerated.

- The U.S. has the capability to trace fissile material back to the supplier and the U.S. will apply all means of our national power to reprimand violators.
- Supporting proliferation makes you a justifiable military target; there will be military, political, and economic consequences.
- Economic development and international assistance depends on not supporting proliferation.
- Prosperity depends on regional cooperation, not confrontation.
- Proliferation activities prevent the full spectrum of normal interactions, as well as reduce the possibility of achieving international legitimacy and status.
- Gaining the respect and support of the international community depends on complying with international law, UN Security Council Resolutions, the IAEA, and other WMD-related conventions.

B.8. Recommended Actions.

- Pursue the possibility of face-to-face engagement between top-level U.S. and Iranian officials.
- President Bush should announce that the U.S. would be willing to take the initial steps to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran with a view toward eventually opening an embassy in Tehran.
- U.S. should announce that Iran has the right to have nuclear power, provided it is in full compliance with the NPT and provide tangible support towards that development.
- Emphasize that new diplomatic efforts and dialogue towards Iran mean compliance with IAEA verification of Iranian nuclear facilities.
- Announce that if Iran cooperates, the U.S. will help them become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- Convince Iran that bellicose pronouncements about the existence of Israel and the Holocaust does not serve Iran's national interests.
- Convince Israel to make a statement in support of new U.S. diplomatic developments between the U.S. and Iran.
- Convince Israel to tone-down their public statements about attacking Iran.
- Engage with U.S. allies and friends to increase security guarantees, especially with China, Russia, and the EU3.
- Develop a compendium of past Iranian statements concerning their intentions regarding WMD, statements by Iranian dissidents, former scientists, et al., concerning WMD.
- Provide detailed descriptions and diagrams of exactly how far the Iranians have gone in WMD-related production.
- IAEA, EU3, and UN consider sponsoring the above documents on dedicated TV and radio specials, and consider establishment of a WMD-related website shared with allies that would contain data, ranges, WMD conventions of which Iran is a signatory, together with statements by Iranian leaders, scientists, expatriates, et al.
- Produce TV reruns of Chernobyl, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Translate into Persian Farsi and transmit via all means available into Iran, including the Internet.
- Distribute diagrams and fact sheets of range delivery fans for Iran's current missile and aircraft fleet.

- Distribute figures depicting how much money has been spent to date on the nuclear program contrasted with the amount spent on the average Iranian citizen.

Note: Many of the recommended actions are directly tied to other actions and messages. For example, U.S. direct involvement in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict (action) and that no U.S. administration will abandon Israel (message). In other words, the recommendations are tied to a wider regional context.

B.9. Iranian Communications. Central to successful communication with the Iranians is the understanding of how information is transmitted, read, and understood by the Iranian people. Information conduits should be analyzed by subject matter experts to ensure these communication paths are exploited to maximize messaging.

B.9.1. Press and Printed Media. Currently, there are about 650 serial publications in Iran, including 26 dailies, 241 weeklies and monthlies, 120 quarterlies, and dozens of professional journals that are printed every 6 months. While most of these publications are in Farsi, there are also some in foreign languages, including Arabic and English. With the exception of a few publications, they are all funded by government or semi-government organizations, mostly supportive of the Islamic Revolution, and controlled by the government. Regardless of origin, only a few publications are significant. The journals and newspapers briefly described in this plan are published regularly, have relatively large circulation, and provide significant information about government policies, factional fighting, and public opinion, and about political, social, and economic changes in the country.

B.9.2. Newspapers. The main newspapers include *Ettela'at* and *Kayhan*. Several of Tehran's newspapers and magazines are now available on line in Persian, Arabic, and English including Iran News and Iran Daily. There are several important newspapers: *Salam* (Peace), *Rasalat* (Mission), *Kayhan* (Universe), *Kayhan International*, *Tehran Times*, *Jomhuri Islami* (the Islamic Republic), *Ettela'at* (Information), and *Hamshahri* (Fellow Citizen).



Figure B3. Iranian newspaper.

B.9.2.1. *Salam* is a Farsi morning daily that reflects the views of the so-called hard-liners, or what the Iranians call leftists (*chapiha*), namely the *Majmay-e Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez* (the Association of Combatant Clerics). Sometimes critical of the policies of the former Rafsanjani government, *Salam* includes an entire column called *alow-salam* (hello peace), with a telephone number for readers to call to voice their complaints and opinions. These calls are published in the newspaper along with the editor's comments. Callers usually talk about corruption, nepotism, skyrocketing prices, inflation, or voice other complaints. *Salam*, like several other publications, also prints proceedings of the *Majles* (Parliament) where issues are debated and cabinet members are questioned by the *Majles'* deputies. This characteristic makes it one of the most widely read government-controlled publications in Iran. Directed and owned by Mohammad Asghar Musavi Khoweiniha, *Salam* is an excellent source for information on factional fighting and controversial issues in the regime.

B.9.2.2. *Rasalat* is another daily that focuses on ideology and reflects the views of Jame'ay-e Mobarez-e Ruhaniyat-e Tehran (the Tehran Society for the Combatant Clergy). Owned by the Rasalat Foundation and supervised by four jurists (foqaha), *Rasalat* uses headlines, articles, and editorials to project the concerns of what is called the traditional wing of the “rightists” (rasti-hay-e sonnati). As such the paper is extremely anti-American and anti-Israeli in its rhetoric – perhaps because of the presence of “hard-liners” on its editorial board.

B.9.2.3. *Kayhan*, published in several languages (Farsi, English, Arabic, Turkish, and others), also focuses on ideology, but is able to target young revolutionary zealots in other Islamic countries as well as in Iran due to its foreign language editions. The English version, *Kayhan International*, which targets young non-Iranian Islamists, is published daily. The Farsi version is also published daily, whereas the foreign-language editions targeting the Middle East and South and Central Asia are weeklies or bimonthlies. As far as ideology is concerned, *Kayhan* can be considered the “Pravda” of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, the English version, like the editions in other languages, discusses the various aspects of Islamist ideology, but it is also filled with anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric covering U.S. and Israeli intentions and policies. A great deal of space is devoted to the recent U.S. embargo against Iran and to the Middle East Peace Process.



Figure B4. *Kayhan* Online Publication.

B.9.2.4. *The Tehran Times*, an English daily, targets the West and other non-Muslim audiences, unlike *Kayhan International*. The paper’s anti-American rhetoric is moderate, but its criticism of Zionism retains the strident tone of most other Iranian publications. Religious articles are rare; instead, the editors concentrate on economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and sports topics in addition to the local and regional news. Owned and published by the Islamic Guidance and Communications Organization, this English daily tries to portray the Islamic Republic of Iran as a team player and a responsible member of the international community, making every effort to show that it will soon become a strong country in the region. With the exception of speeches and sermons by the supreme leader and other religious elite, most of the articles in *Tehran Times* are written by technocrats, scientists, and other non-clerical intellectuals.

B.9.2.5. *Ettela'at* is a Farsi daily that targets the non-revolutionary segments of the Iranian population. The paper is not as anti-American as *Rasalat* and *Salam*, but anti-Zionist rhetoric is very strong. *Ettela'at* uses different methods of teaching Islam to the general public; for example, it awards prizes to those readers who can provide the greatest number of correct answers to a series of multiple-choice questions. Most of these questions are concerned with details of Islamic ideology. Quotations from Imam Khomeini appear in a special column entitled “From the Imam's River of Words” (“Az Kousar-e Kalam-e Imam”; the word kousar refers to the water in paradise). This paper also prints articles on some fundamental concepts of Shi'a Islamism, such as fiqh (jurisprudence), velayat-e faqih (government of the jurist), and so

on. Analytical articles on politics, science and technology, and other nonreligious topics are also common. In general, *Ettela'at* seems to reflect the views of the government, and it is probably the most well-known daily in Iran. The religious content aside, *Ettela'at* can be viewed as the *New York Times* of Iran because of its analytical articles, editorials, and advertisements.

B.9.2.6. *Jomhuri Islami* is another Farsi daily that appears to target the general public. Once an organ of the Islamic Republic Party, this newspaper usually reflects the moderate views of the government. Unconcerned with ideology, *Jomhuri Islami* is the least anti-American newspaper in the country. Most of its space is devoted to news items related to the economy, politics, science, technology, sports, and other items of interest. However, if it were not for occasional news items such as the recent court proceedings of the embezzlements at the Export Bank (Bank-e Saderat), it would be a very dull paper.

B.9.2.7. *Hamshahri*, which is owned by the municipality of Tehran, publishes political articles and deals with the everyday problems of Tehran's residents. It reflects the views of technocrats and the rest of the industrial rightists. *Hamshahri* seems to be the most popular publication in the country. Reportedly it refrains from discussing political issues and concentrates on practical matters such as improving city services and government efficiency.

B.9.3. Periodicals. The major periodicals include *Pasdar-e Islam* (Guardian of Islam), *Yad* (Memory), *Soroush* (Angel), and *Kiyan* (Star or Soul).

B.9.3.1. *Pasdar-e Islam* is a Farsi magazine issued monthly that focuses on Islamist ideology. Published by Qom's Islamic Propaganda Office, *Pasdar-e Islam* provides the reader with the philosophy of Islamism and mainly targets the religious elite and young revolutionary zealots. The key communicators used by *Pasdar-e Islam* include the late Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, and other ayatollahs (sign of God) and hojatolislams (proof of God) from Qom and seminaries elsewhere. Khomeini and Khamenei's speeches, sermons, and writings are quoted in headlines, editorials, and special columns at the beginning and final sections of this magazine. Articles by other high-ranking clerics constitute the main section.

B.9.3.2. *Yad* is another Farsi periodical issued quarterly that focuses on ideology, but it emphasizes the history and political culture of the Islamic Revolution. Published by the Foundation for the History of the Iranian Revolution, *Yad* is a good source for assessing the rationale behind the foreign and domestic policies of the Islamic Republic. It targets the religious elite and the youth. Like *Pasdar-e Islam*, *Yad* is also extremely critical of the West, especially the United States and Israel. The primary contributors of articles to this journal are affiliated with the Foundation for the Council of Scholars.

B.9.3.3. *Kiyan* reflects the current ideological thinking of "liberals." According to press reports, *Kiyan* discusses secular issues such as mutual tolerance, pluralism, and multiparty politics. It even debates the legitimacy of the *velayat-e faqih* (government of the jurisprudent) and *rahbar* (supreme leader).

B.9.4. Radio and Television. Radio and television broadcasting is controlled by the government through the PTT, via the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. There are 5 FM stations, 72 AM stations, and 28 television broadcast stations. There are three national radio channels: Radio Networks 1 and 2, and Radio Qur'an. Radio Qur'an has 53 transmitters and broadcasts recitals of the Qur'an and other religious programs. Its broadcasts reach Europe, central Asian republics of the CIS, Asia, Africa, and parts of the United States. It has medium-wave regional broadcasts in Arabic, Armenian, Assyrian, Azerbaijani, Baluchi, Bandari, Dari, Farsi, Kurdish, Mazandarani, Pashtu, Turkoman, Turkish, and Urdu and external broadcasts in English, French, German, Spanish, Turkish, Arabic, Kurdish, Urdu, Pashtu, Armenian, Bengali, and Russian. There is one major television station, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its capabilities are: 625-line, System B; Secam color, with two production centers in Tehran producing for two networks and 28 local TV stations. There are 17 million radios and 4.61 million televisions in Iran.



Figure B5: Radio Tehran Web Site.

B.9.5. Telecommunication.

B.9.5.1. There are 6.3 million telephones in Iran. The domestic system is serviced by ground-based, microwave, radio-relay and satellite-based, very-small-aperture-terminals (VSATs). The microwave network consists of three networks designed to integrate, augment, and expand PTT systems with high-capacity voice, television, and data transmission circuits. The first network is the Central Treaty Organization System; the second is the 7-Links; and the third and largest is the Integrated Network Telecommunications System. All three networks were completed in the mid-1970s, and the equipment is outdated. The old analog networks are being converted to a digital microwave network. The analog network uses frequency division multiplexing and transmission.

B.9.5.2. The international system is served by satellite earth stations. In addition, high frequency (HF) radio and microwave radio-relay provides service to Turkey, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Service to the UAE is via submarine fiber-optic cable. Iran has three INTELSAT satellite ground terminals (two Atlantic Ocean and one Indian Ocean) and one International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) ground terminal (Indian Ocean region). The Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) is evaluating bids internationally for a PCM 4 multiplex system. A PCM 4 transmission system quadruples each telephone line's capacity; TCI intends to use 100,000 lines with the PCM 4, thus adding another 400,000 lines to the country's fixed telephone network. Iran also has a mobile cellular phone network.

B.9.5.3. Iran strives to use satellite communications to advance its military potential and its domestic, economic, and regional status. A key element of its ambitious modernization plans is deploying a national communications satellite (COMSAT) system. Additionally, Iran has a satellite data reception site, allowing it to receive meteorological and

limited Earth resources data. The satellite development program is proceeding in three phases. Phase One includes the expansion and upgrade of the existing INTELSAT and INMARSAT ground stations. Phase Two includes the installation of 61 earth stations and 3,000 small terminals. Phase Three includes launching the ZOHREH satellite and converting from INTELSAT to the domestic satellite (DOMSAT) for domestic communications.

B.9.5.4. Cellular networks have been installed in Tehran, Esfahan, Ahvaz, Bandar-e Abbas, Kerman, Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz, the free trade zones on Kish and Qeshm islands, and over 230 other cities. This growth will continue as coverage areas are extended to meet demand from other population centers. The number of total subscribers reached 650,000 in 2002.

B.9.6 Internet.

B.9.6.1. Internet usage in Iran is expanding dramatically (see Table B1 below). In 1999, there was only a single Internet service provider (ISP); today, there are well over a hundred. Because overseas telephone rates are expensive in Iran, Iranians use inexpensive personal computers at Internet cafes to talk to relatives and friends outside of the country. This has caused government attempts to regulate the use of personal computers as phones, despite the difficulties involved in doing so.

B.9.6.2. As of early 2002, Iran was linked to the Internet only via satellite, causing a 600-millisecond lag in connection and allowing only a total of 300mbits of bandwidth, countrywide. Only one ISP offers 56kbps dial-up, and this company must rent its phone lines from the government. The Iranian regime generally perceives the Internet to be a threat and seeks to centralize access through the Ministry of PTT. E-mail to Tehran is often delayed more than 24 hours and messages are scrutinized for content. Despite this, Internet usage in Iran continues to grow, as does the number of Iran-based websites. President Ahmadinejad has his own website to promote his platform and philosophy.



Figure B6. President Ahmadinejad's Personal Website.

Year	Users	Population	% of Population	Growth (2000-2006)
2000	250k	~70 million	3.8	-
2002	5.5m	"	7.5	-
2005	7.5m	"	10.8	2,900.0%

Table B1: Internet Usage Growth in Iran⁷

B.9.7. Blogs. As of August 2, 2005, the following Blogs could be used to promulgate possible messages into Iran: Ekbatan Observer, Iran Scan, Persian Dissident, Iran-Shahr, Editor: Myself, Iran Press Service, Iran Votes 2005, S'CAN-IRANIC, Free Ganji, and Regime Change Iran.⁸

Annex C: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) -- The Hermit Kingdom

C.1. Background. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as the DPRK or North Korea) has remained true to the *Chuch'e* (or Juche pronounced joo-cheh) doctrine. *Chuch'e* means self-reliance, and signifies the overarching philosophy which guides North Korean politics as well as their way of life.

C.1.1 *Chuch'e* is a collective theory that was extracted from the Confucian ideals of collectivism and then applied to a political system. *Chuch'e* denies individual freedoms, but offers collective freedom from "invidious U.S. intentions." The ideology is borne out of necessity and historic fear of foreign occupation. Promulgated by Kim Il Sung, *Chuch'e* is a political ideology that applies Marxism-Leninism to the North Korean culture. "Based on autonomy and self-reliance, *Chuch'e* has been popularized since 1955 as an official guideline for independence in politics, economics, national defense, and foreign policy."⁹

C.1.2. Since his father's death (Kim Il-Sung) in 1994, North Korea has been led by Kim Jong-il (KJI). KJI quickly, and some thought surprisingly, consolidated his power by purging antagonists, slowly shifting power from the Korean Workers Party (KWP) to the Korean People's Army (KPA), and by promoting advocates.¹⁰

C.1.3. To further inculcate his own brand of North Korean politics, KJI proclaimed his "military-first politics" (*son'gun chŏngch'i*, 1997). The military, from the North Korean perspective, is viewed as the most important element of their national power. Conventionally, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) has been used for decades to successfully threaten their neighbors to bargain for political and economic gain.

C.1.4. Another important pillar of their ideology is the concept called *kangsŏngdaeguk* (1998) or establishing a "strong and prosperous country." From the North Korean standpoint, nuclear weapons and missile technology are key components of projecting their strength and their nation as a powerful state.¹¹

C.1.5. In short, North Korea views *son'gun chŏngch'i* and *kangsŏngdaeguk* as the underlying principles to achieve state objectives. This does not mean that their doctrine or their ideologies are fully realized however, it does provide insight into their worldview and their political ideology.

C.1.6. Considering the overarching *Chuch'e* doctrine, combined with their political and social principles outlined under *son'gun*, and *kangsŏngdaeguk*, and with recent U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with more recent U.S. economic pressures, North Korea's



Figure C1. Juche Tower, Pyongyang, DPRK, Standing 160 feet (interestingly, about 5 feet taller than the Washington Monument)

decision to detonate a nuclear device (albeit a very small one) represents a concerted strategy to counter any U.S. intentions of invading and bringing about regime change in Pyongyang. By joining the nuclear club, North Korea also views the detonation as a means of providing a level of international prestige, bolstering the philosophy of *kangsŏngdaeguk*, that will most assuredly be used as a powerful bargaining chip, whether they abandon nuclear weapons or not.

C.1.7. Furthermore, the timing of the decision corresponds with the U.S. being stretched thin by prolonged deployments and growing concerns with Iran and the Middle East as well as U.S. economic sanctions (e.g., Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA)).¹²

C.2. *The Requirement.* To successfully convey and persuade the North Korean regime that it is in their national interest not to possess nuclear weapons or to transfer that technology or capability to other nations or groups. Central components of this plan will be designed to convince the North Koreans that:

- The U.S. is willing to have bilateral discussions as long as the Six-Party discussions continue to be the primary platform for discussions and reconciliation.
- North Korea is safe from invasion if they decide to allow complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of their nuclear weapons program.
- A nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is key to ensuring the security of Northeast Asia.
- There are economic rewards for compliance.
- Long-term peace is achievable.
- Also central to achieving success will be the ability to leverage China, South Korea, Russia and Japan to communicate (using messages and actions) our intent with North Korea.

C.2.1. China. Historically, culturally, politically, and economically China represents the North Korean's closest ally and most important influencer. Both countries share communist roots and historic combat alliances (Korean War), as well as cultural linkages and common rivals (e.g., Japan).

C.2.1.1. In addition to these important connections, China is also North Korea's largest international trade partner.¹³ North Korea is largely dependent on Chinese fuel and food. Due to these commonalities and trade dependences, China is positioned to have the most influence.

C.2.1.2. Complicating China's role in negotiating with North Korea, as well as influencing non-proliferation, is North Korea's seemingly independence (i.e., Chuch'e). China's overarching goal for the Korean peninsula is stability, and the DPRK's missile launches and subsequent atomic detonation did not lend themselves to stabilizing the peninsula, and more than likely helped destabilize the region.

C.2.1.3. China is seemingly in the midst of a balancing act. Wang Qinghong, a fellow of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Hawaii-based think-tank, said that, "On the one hand, the Chinese government really wants to punish this kind of test, but at the same time, we [they] don't want the regime to collapse, or there will be big social and political problems for China."

C.2.1.4. The reasons for China wanting to support the North Korean regime are many. First, China fears regional nuclear proliferation as Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) consider how to respond to a nuclear-capable DPRK. China is also very concerned that regime collapse would cause economic burdens on their northeastern provinces, which are still in transition from years of state-run planning, by a flood of refugees seeking food and assistance. Additionally, China feels a certain kinship to North Korea in that the DPRK remains one of the last bastions of communist rule, and feels obligated to help their communist comrades.¹⁴ Certainly having a communist ally fail in their backyard could incite internal destabilizing factions (i.e., color revolutions similar to what occurred post-Soviet Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan), which China clearly does not want.¹⁵ China also realizes that it is in their best interest to maintain a strategic buffer between U.S. forces and their border. Equally, they view a unified Korea allied with the United States as a potential threat, and therefore desire a North Korean regime so positioned.¹⁶

C.2.1.5. Interestingly, however, China did voice concern about both long-range missile testing and the nuclear test by adopting unanimously, as part of the United Nations Security Council, a series of economic and commercial sanctions on the DPRK (Resolution 1718; 14 October 2006). These provisions state:

- North Korea must “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile,” “suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme,” and “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”
- The DPRK must also “return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition.”
- Shipments of cargo going to and from North Korea may be stopped and inspected for weapons of mass destruction or associated items (however, there is no obligation placed on member states to perform such inspections).
- A ban is placed on imports and exports of “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems,” “related materiel including spare parts,” and any other items identified by the sanctions committee.
- UN member states must freeze the overseas assets of individuals and companies involved with the DPRK’s weapons programs. An international travel ban is also placed on program employees and their families.
- UN members are banned from exporting luxury goods to North Korea.

C.2.1.6. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter. This particular Chapter allows the UN to take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security”. Voting for the resolution is a fairly strong gesture on China’s part, considering its past history of reprimanding North Korea.

C.2.1.7. Although China voted in favor of the resolution, they also back-peddled some by stating:

- China did not approve of the practice of inspecting cargo to and from the DPRK, and they had reservations about related provisions of the resolution. China strongly urged the countries concerned to adopt a prudent and responsible attitude in that regard, and to refrain from taking any provocative steps that could intensify the tension.
- China probably fears that de-stabilizing sanctions or provocative actions could escalate the situation, and feel that negotiation and diplomacy, coupled with economic benefits, will better solve the North Korean problem.

C.2.2. Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). The ROK and China have unique relationships with the DPRK, and as such remain the two most important influencers. Of course, South Korea's approach to their threatening brothers in the North is now under scrutiny after the DPRK's nuclear test.

C.2.2.1. The so-called Sunshine Policy (devised under Kim Dae Jung), and continued under Roh Moo-hyun, has sent billions of dollars in aid to the North over the past six years, with the belief that engagement would improve their relations. But now it seems that this policy has been a failed strategy, and Roh's popularity ratings are in the teens.

C.2.2.2. Publicly the ROK government states that it desires to use the Six-Party Talks to convince the DPRK to implement the September 19th Joint Statement.¹⁷ Although the likelihood of tangible results are slim, the current ROK government simply cannot change its political course and must hope that tensions are minimized.

C.2.2.3. Despite North Korean bellicose comments and provocative acts directed against the South, the two governments have continued cooperation on projects such as Kaesong Industrial Park and the tourist resort at Mount Kumgang (although there is mounting political pressure to change this). However, after the missile launch, and then again after the nuclear test, South Korea has been withholding some of their scheduled aid shipments. South Korea's positions include:

- The North's nuclear capability does not substantially increase the threat since long range artillery and multiple rocket launcher (MRLs) always were ready to bomb Seoul (i.e., Seoul Proximity Problem).
- Seoul wants to bring about gradual change so that the income gaps between North and the South narrow, so that if DPRK regime change (by any method) occurs, the financial burden would be lessened.
- Seoul's reluctance to join the Proliferation Security Initiative indicates a proclivity not to provoke Pyongyang.
- Having already suffered humiliating defeats, the Uri Party's (Roh's Party) problems continue to mount, and the nuclear test is seen as another policy failure of the Roh Administration and the Uri Party.
- Seoul provides enough aid that cutting it would negatively impact the North's economy; for example, recent National Assembly approved cuts for inter-Korean expenditures (650 billion won to 500 billion won) indicate political positioning by both parties.

- The strength of the U.S.-South Korean alliance remains central to the security of the Korean peninsula.
- South Korea and China continue their economic relationship as China replaced the U.S. as the number one trading partner with Seoul (2003).

C.2.3. Russia.

C.2.3.1. Although not as influential as it once was, Russia remains a key third party influencer as it has current, as well as historic, economic, political, and military connections. Certainly the state visits between President Putin and KJI have demonstrated a willingness by both countries to continue this historic relationship. Russia, much like China, wants the region to be stable and has stated numerous times that the Korean peninsula should be nuclear free.

C.2.3.2. Despite adopting UN Resolution 1718 condemning North Korea's nuclear testing, Russia continues to advance economic ties with the DRPK as diplomatic doors remain quite open.¹⁸ Russia's positions in the region include:

- Russia values its economic relationship with the ROK and has to balance their support for the North with economic opportunity in the South.
- Russia is unhappy with the U.S. as sole superpower and would like to find a way to assert itself in the Pacific region.
- Russia objects to U.S. and Japanese deployment of missile defense forces in the region.*
- Russia also has concerns that North Korean nuclear material might find its way into the hands of Muslim militants — the Chechnya separatists killed more than 300 children in Beslan (2004). Thus, U.S. interests in preventing proliferation by Pyongyang are closely linked to Chinese and Russian concerns that North Korea might become a channel for leaking nuclear materials to Muslim terrorists.
- Peace in Korea will secure peace in Northeast Asia, which in turn would stabilize Russia's position in the region. These developments would benefit Russia as it faces transitional difficulties in politics, economics and military affairs.
- Development of the coastal sector of Russia's Siberia is a major national objective. But such a development cannot be realized without peace in Korea. Stability and international cooperation in the neighboring areas are necessary for Russia's development.
- Russians are still requiring re-payment on North Korean debt (acquired during the old former Soviet Union days).

* Russia also objects to the deployment of ground-based mid-course interceptors in Poland, along with their associated radars. To the extent these two positions are related, a comprehensive understanding with Russia could be helpful in dissuading North Korea and Iran (the latter against whom the European-based interceptors are intended).

C.2.4. Japan.

C.2.4.1. As a participating member of the six-way talks, a regional economic powerhouse, and strong U.S. ally, Japan probably has less influence with North Korea than any other member of the six-way talks. Historically, the North Koreans refuse to forget Japan's brutal occupation of their country. In fact, as part of Korean history, North Koreans are taught that the "Great Leader" Kim il-sung fought against Japanese imperialism with Mao Zedong.

C.2.4.2. The Japanese, the only casualties of a nuclear attack, are very sensitive to North Korea possessing a nuclear weapon. Recently, the international community was extremely concerned whether North Korean nuclear brinkmanship would cause an overreaction by the Japanese government – although this was clearly abated by Prime Minister Abe's statement that Japan will adhere to the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

C.2.4.3. Adherence to the non-nuclear principles does not mean that the Japanese are not considering changing Article 9 of their Constitution, which forbids Japan from having an army or engaging in warfare. "I believe we should revise Article 9 from the point of view that we should protect Japan, and that the country should make a global contribution (to security)," a Japanese official quoted Abe as saying in an interview with the British newspaper, *Financial Times* (Nov 2006).

C.2.4.4. Officially Japan views their diplomatic strategy as providing both "carrots and sticks," or as they call it "dialog and pressure." Their two-pronged approach attempts to persuade North Korea with diplomatic openness and consultations, while simultaneously pressuring North Korea through their participation in the PSI, as well as exchanging information with regards to illegal activities (counterfeiting, money laundering, drug trafficking) and denying access to their ports and territorial waters.

C.2.4.5. One of the most important issues confronting Japan and the DRPK is the abduction issue. As such developments dealing with the abduction issue take place – which is of the highest priority for Japan – Japan has been repeatedly and strongly requesting: prompt return of the surviving abductees, unveiling of truth regarding those whose whereabouts are unconfirmed, and handing over of suspects. Japan has been consistent in its stance that diplomatic relations cannot be normalized without first resolving the abduction, nuclear, missile, and other issues.¹⁹

C.2.4.6. North Korea counters the abduction issue with "settlement of the past" issues, including the matter concerning victims during Japan's colonial period. Clearly there are political as well as historical obstacles between the two countries. Japan's positions reflect:

- Japan is serious about punishing North Korea for their testing; Japan has banned North Korean ships from its ports and halted trade and financial flows.
- Japan wants full accountability on the abduction issue; President Abe is known for his hard-line stance on North Korea's abductions.

- A crackdown on the Chosen Soren (an association of pro-North Korean residents in Japan), both in terms of economic transfers and other pro-North Korean activities; Chosen Soren has seemingly entered a period of decline, and the Japanese wish this trend to continue.
- Japan is making efforts to improve Japan-China relations and views China's economic development is an opportunity.
- Japan is considering changes to Article 9 in response to the missile testing and nuclear detonation.
- While the Japan-ROK relationship faced some difficulties in 2005 surrounding such issues as dealing with Takeshima (in Korean Dokdo) and history recognition, people-to-people and economic exchanges have steadily developed.

C.3. Premise and Components.

C.3.1. With the Six-Party Talks at the center piece for reconciliation over the nuclear issue, it remains relevant but not very successful. Uniting the five other nations into a unified strategy, and not allowing the DPRK to divisively play participants against each other, is central to having successful discourse with the DPRK. U.S. allies and friends must have a unified front to ensure six-way negotiation success. This should begin with the U.S. announcement of a clear vision. The U.S. vision should include security assurances, economic cooperation, and diplomatic recognition. In exchange for these messages and actions would be North Korea's complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons program. The next step would entail discussions with related nations to seek understanding, consensus, and pledges to support the U.S. vision.

C.3.2. Certainly South Korean and Chinese roles should be amplified and possibly used as front-end facilitators. Bilateral talks between China, South Korea, and North Korea could also provide opportunities to exploit and leverage non-proliferation issues during six-way negotiations.

C.3.3. The U.S. should also consider bilateral talks as a form of incentive while simultaneously working the Six-Party avenues. North Korea wants recognition from the U.S. and guarantees that regime change is not around the corner. Consideration should be given to ending the Korean War, and perhaps that could lead to fewer weapon systems along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), as well as movement on the nuclear issue. Ratcheting up tensions with the DPRK has not historically worked and finally ending the Korean War maybe a peaceful first step in moving forward.

C.3.4. Any engagement policy selected should be closely aligned with an information strategy that strengthens the U.S. position while maintaining a sense of fairness and equity (with the North Koreans and the International Community), while not seeming hegemonic and belligerent.

C.4. Participants and Conduits.

- Governments (e.g., China, ROK, Japan, Russia, India)
- International organizations (e.g., IAEA, UN, ASEAN)
- Proliferation Security Initiative members
- Nonproliferation and roll-back regimes (e.g., Japan, Republic of Korea)
- Signatories to all WMD conventions
- Military conduits
- Commercial entities
- Academics
- All source media and cyber
- NGOs
- Surrogates
- Special interlocutors

C.5. Target Audiences.

- Kim Jong-il
- North Korean Military Leadership (KPA)
- North Korean Policy Elites
- Korean Workers Party (KWP) members
- Allies and friends
- Regional influencers (China, ROK, Japan, Russia)
- International organizations (ASEAN, UN)

C.6. Requirements.

- Dedicated Policy and Coordination Committee (PCC) to ensure planning and execution of the SC strategy. Includes oversight of:
 - Objectives
 - Guidance
 - Limitations
 - Coordinating interaction
 - Timing constraints.
- SC coordination mechanisms
 - Immediately begin a selective political engagement process with Pyongyang.
 - Send envoys to key allies and friends/communicators/interlocutors in each target country and at each international organization.
 - Broaden Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) agenda focused on non-proliferation.

C.8. Themes and Messages. Note that to achieve maximum resonance, most of these would best be conveyed by non-U.S. communicators.

- If Pyongyang returns to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and complies with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, the ROK, U.S., and the World are willing to discuss North Korea's peaceful use of nuclear energy for medical or industrial purposes.
- The U.S. is willing to sign a formal non-aggression security guarantee or contemplate ending the Korean War.
- We acknowledge the sovereignty of North Korea and do not advocate unprovoked military action against it by the United States or any other country. Note that this must be conveyed in such a manner that it is clear that the U.S. will continue to recognize the sovereignty of South Korea.
- The U.S. is willing to consider diplomatic relations, as well as opening of liaison offices in each other's capital and eventual full-diplomatic relations.
- ROK/U.S. alliance is strong and the U.S. remains firmly committed to render prompt and effective assistance to repel any armed attack against South Korea in accordance with their joint defense treaty of 1954; and the U.S. remains dedicated to defeat any DPRK aggression.
- ROK-US Alliance is more than military; it is a comprehensive partnership that promotes freedom, prosperity, and democracy.
- The U.S. also strongly believes that human rights reforms in North Korea will advance the cause of international peace.
- The goals of liberty and security are intertwined; the international community must pursue them on a linked, coordinated, and interactive basis.
- The world can help North Korea economically, if North Korea demonstrates peaceful existence.
- The U.S. will consider economic stimulation programs to help DPRK economy.
- The U.S. can help with energy needs, to include technology transfers, if Pyongyang returns to the NPT and complies with IAEA inspections.
- The peace and stability of the Korean peninsula are central to the security of Northeast Asia, which in turn is vital to the security of the United States.
- The United States will continue to provide a nuclear umbrella for the Republic of Korea.
- Affirm the positions of the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, China (19 September 2005).
- The U.S. is willing to discuss removing the DPRK from the State Department's list of states that sponsor international terrorism if Pyongyang can provide assurances not to provide nuclear technology or assistance to rogue states or terrorist organizations.

C.9. Recommended Actions.

- Washington and Beijing need to reach a new understanding on the future of the Korean peninsula and settle on an endgame strategy in North Korea to force a shift in Mr. Kim's strategic thinking.
 - China's interests in a non-nuclear North Korea focus on preventing nuclear proliferation elsewhere in Asia — especially Japan, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan.
 - China has its own battle with Muslim extremists in the far western province of Xinjiang and the last thing Beijing would want is for there to be any danger of Uighur terrorists obtaining nuclear materials from a proliferating Pyongyang.

- Send a high ranking envoy to Pyongyang to discuss non-proliferation and possible ending of the Korean War
 - Develop steps to bring North Korea into the community of nations (this should also be a strategy for all participants).
 - Begin dialogue about a possible embassy in Pyongyang.
- Bind together energy assistance with denuclearization; China and South Korea should lead this effort.
- U.S. announce trade liberalization with and by North Korea or possible credit installments extended to North Korea and collateralized by claims on its mineral resources.
- Announce that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be strengthened and expanded to encompass surface and air surveillance and interdiction of suspected exports of nuclear materials and weapon-system components.
- Appeal to Japan to conduct high-level talks with Pyongyang – preferably Prime Minister Abe.
- Engage Russia and convince them that a rogue North Korean element may sell nuclear technology into the hands of Muslim militants — in its case, the Chechnya separatists; convince the Russians to leverage their influence towards denuclearization.
- Announce U.S. and Japanese /ROK Missile Defense talks and discuss deployment – which is underway. Reassuring the Japanese on this issue, and making South Korea an equal partner are critical steps.

C.10. DPRK Communications -- A Voice of Propaganda.

C.10.1. All of the North Korean media is rigidly controlled by the state. For the past 50 years the North Korean regime has continually berated the U.S. and the ROK (mere puppets of U.S. will). Their media strategy is designed to control ideas and manifest a cult-like following for the Kim Family Regime (KFR).

C.10.2. The official state news agency Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the newspaper of the Korean Workers' Party (Nodong Sinmun), and the broadcast media Pyongyang Radio and TV, comprise some of the most important sources of information on a largely closed and tightly controlled society.

C.10.3. Television: Four networks (includes Korean Central Television, Mansudae Television, Korean Educational and Cultural Network, and Kaesong Television targeting South Korea) (2003).

C.10.4. Radio: North Korean's main radio station is called Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS); there are approximately 17 AM stations, 14 FM, and 14 Shortwave stations (2003).

C.10.3. Newspapers: A number of newspapers are published. *Nodong simmun* (Workers' Daily), the organ of the party Central Committee, claimed a circulation of approximately 1.5 million as of 1988. *K lloja* (The Worker), the theoretical organ of the party Central Committee, claims a circulation of about 300,000 readers. *Minju Chosn* (Democratic

Korea) is the government newspaper, and *Nodong chngnyn* (Working Youth) is the newspaper of the SWYL. There also are specialized newspapers for teachers, the army, and railway workers.

C.10.4. Internet: Extremely limited use; only the elite have access, and some of that is limited by governmental firewalls.

Annex D - Republic of India -- An Old Nuclear Power.

D.1. Background. The Republic of India is the seventh-largest country by geographical area, the second most populous country, and the most populous liberal democracy in the world.

D.1.1. India became a nuclear power in May 1974 with a “peaceful explosion” of an atomic bomb. In May 1998, responding to Ghauri missile test-firing in Pakistan, India tested three devices at the Pokhran underground testing site, followed by two more tests.



Figure D1. A general view depicting the crater of underground nuclear explosion test conducted on May 11, 1998, at Pokhran in Rajasthan.

D.1.2. According to a RAND study on *India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture* (2001), India’s nuclear doctrine is based on a compromise between having a “ready arsenal” and a “recessed deterrent.”

A **ready arsenal** would involve creating a nuclear force consisting of a sizable inventory of weapons that are maintained in military custody in peacetime and ready for immediate use. In contrast, a **recessed deterrent** would involve developing various elements needed for an effective deterrent without actually producing a standing nuclear force. The **force-in-being** implies that India’s nuclear capabilities will be strategically active, but operationally dormant, giving New Delhi the capability to execute retaliatory actions within a matter of hours to weeks. Such a capability will allow India to gain in security, status, and prestige, while simultaneously exhibiting restraint. India will acquire a nominal deterrence capability against Pakistan and China, while avoiding both the high costs of a ready arsenal and any weakening of its long tradition of strict civilian control over the military.²⁰




Figure D2. Depiction of India’s decision to have nuclear weapons without having them ready to fire (e.g., different custodians of key subcomponents)

D.1.3. Possibly the closest New Delhi has come to defining their nuclear strategy is a report by the National Security Advisory Board in India entitled *Indian Nuclear Doctrine* (1999). India stated that:

- India would not be the **first to use** nuclear weapons and would support a treaty on non-use of nuclear weapons.
- India supports negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention.
- India supports the inclusion of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as a crime in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

D.1.4. India’s no-first-use policy, coupled with their force-in-being strategy, means that India would respond if attacked by nuclear weapons; the response would be delayed but assured. India’s motivations to renew testing in 1998 reflected their growing concern with the Chinese-Pakistani relationship, as the Chinese have helped Pakistan with both missile and nuclear weapon development.

D.1.5. More recently the U.S. Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, a bilateral agreement (Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act) which will exempt India from U.S. laws limiting nuclear trade with countries subject to the NPT and from some of the international inspections of nuclear facilities by the IAEA. In turn, India will agree to safeguards and inspections at fourteen civilian nuclear plants (Eight military plants remain off-limits to inspectors). There are three more stages before the agreement actually starts working:

- India and the U.S. have to agree on terms for the lucrative trade deal by which the U.S. sells India’s nuclear technology and fuel - the U.S. Congress has to ratify the deal.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency has to approve a separate nuclear inspection program.
- The Nuclear Suppliers Group, an assembly of nations that exports nuclear material, has to give its approval.²¹

D.1.6. With the U.S. agreeing to provide nuclear technology and fuel, the Indian government has agreed to:

- Not test nuclear weapons (although without signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)).
- Adhere to the highest international standards for controlling sensitive nuclear exports.
- Separating its civilian from its military nuclear facilities, with only civilian facilities becoming eligible for American cooperation.

D.1.7. However, because India has never signed the NPT, the new deal with India (which reverses decades of U.S. policy) could possibly make it more difficult to convince other nations such as Iran and North Korea to abide by the treaty and give up their nuclear weapons programs.

D.2. *The Requirement.* To establish an India-specific U.S. and selected allied strategic communication plan to more clearly and resonantly articulate U.S. policy with regards to India's nuclear strategy, and to ensure that the U.S. minimizes the threat of nuclear weapons use and the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. Explaining why India is unique in the nonproliferation regime is a critical element.

D.3. *Premise and Components.* India's nuclear policy has endured for over 30 years and it is unlikely the U.S. or international sanctions, policies or actions will change India's nuclear strategy. Therefore, the strategic communication strategy that follows will: (1) explain our current policy with regards to India as well as why our relationship is important; (2) reinforce India's obligation not to conduct further nuclear tests; and (3) foster a climate which will prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies (nuclear exports).

D.4. *Participants and Conduits.*

- Governments (e.g., India, Pakistan, China, ROK, Iran, Russia, UK)
- International organizations (e.g., IAEA, NSG, UN, ASEAN)
- Proliferation Security Initiative members
- Signatories to all WMD conventions
- Military conduits
- Commercial entities
- Academics
- All source media and cyber
- NGOs
- Surrogates
- Special interlocutors

D.5. *Target Audiences.*

- Indian Leadership and People

- Members of the NPT and CTBT
- Iranian leadership and People
- North Korean Leadership
- Pakistani Leadership and People
- Chinese Leadership and People
- ASEAN
- IAEA
- NSG

D.6. Requirements.

- Dedicated PCC to ensure objectives, guidance, limits, interaction, and timing constraints are formulated and implemented. Possibilities include existing South Asia PCC, Nonproliferation PCC, a combination, or a new SC-specific PCC (issue – who chairs? Amb Bob Joseph, U/S Hughes, do they co-chair? Given the absence of a serving Special Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication).
- SC coordination mechanisms:
 - Immediate – U.S. Missions to all Arms Control fora.
 - Between them at the interagency in Washington.
 - Between and among key allies and friends (specifically, EU3, Pakistan, China, Russia, Afghanistan).

D.7. Themes and Messages. Note that to achieve maximum resonance, most of these would best be conveyed by non-U.S. communicators.

- The new alliance will strengthen the strategic relationship between America and India, and deliver valuable benefits to both nations.
- The U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act will make it possible for India, the world's fifth-largest consumer of energy, to reduce emissions and improve its environment. India, whose demand for electricity is expected to double by 2015, currently produces nearly 70 percent of its electricity by burning coal, which produces air pollution and greenhouse gases.
- The agreement could also be an economic stimulus and a boon for American companies that have been barred from selling reactors and material to India, where the economy has more than doubled in size since 1991.
- U.S.-India cooperation lays the foundation for a new strategic partnership between our two nations that will help ease India's demands for fossil fuels and ease pressure on global markets.
- The new agreement will help keep the world safe by paving the way for India to join the global effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
- America and India are united by deeply held values.
- Iran and North Korea are driven toward nuclear weapons by their immediate security situations, not by the Indian nuclear program or by U.S. policy toward it.
- If Iranian or North Korean leaders believe that the U.S. opening to India is a sign that their own nuclear programs will soon be accepted, they are mistaken.

- The Indian lesson clearly indicates that states that acquire nuclear weapons may ultimately obtain nuclear energy cooperation, but only after enduring a long period of punishment—in the Indian case, thirty-two years—following a largely responsible foreign policy, and demonstrating commitment to democratic government and the Rule of Law.²²
- Iran, which might have nuclear arms within several years, and North Korea, which has a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability, pose the greatest current threats to nonproliferation.
- If India breaks its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, nuclear cooperation will cease.
- A formal test ban in India should remain a long-term goal for both India and Pakistan.
- The Indians are responsible stewards of sensitive nuclear technology.
- China’s role as a leading provider of sensitive technology to Pakistan has repeatedly strained regional relations and has complicated efforts to expand U.S. and International trade with China.

D.8. Recommended Actions.

- **Work to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies.** As agreed to in the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act; transference, in any manner, remains extremely important and U.S.-Indian cooperation needs to be demonstrated.
 - **Build trust through information sharing.** One of the most important ways to build trust is to share information and intelligence with allies and friends. Through a shared perspective of threats the U.S. and India can strengthen their alliance and minimize regional threats, as well as ensure security of nuclear material.
 - **Help India and Pakistan with hi-tech assistance for nuclear security.** Providing monitoring and intelligence apparatus to ensure nuclear security will enable India and Pakistan to provide better security for nuclear weapons and infrastructure.
- **Encourage India and Pakistan to reconcile the Kashmir issue.** Indo-Pakistani reconciliation of the Kashmir issue will alleviate much of the pressure between these neighboring countries and could lead to minimizing Chinese influence and nuclear proliferation in the region.
- **Leverage the U.S. relationship with Pakistan.** Minimizing the threat between Pakistan and India will help build mutual trust and reduce nuclear and missile competition.
 - Encourage state visits between India and Pakistan.
 - Provide economic incentives for Indo-Pakistani cooperation.
- **Ensure that Indian and Pakistani leaders have emergency communications to stop inadvertent nuclear exchanges.** This would be much like the old Soviet Union-U.S. “hot line” designed to minimize nuclear accidents, ambiguous incidents, or unauthorized actions that might lead to the outbreak of a nuclear exchange.
- **Encourage India, Pakistan, and China to work for a regional moratorium on fissile material production.** Limiting total numbers of material produced will help minimize tensions, lessen the threat of lost material, and encourage regional cooperation.
- **Work with India to develop an overarching strategic vision to guide bilateral U.S.-Indian relations and reconcile the interests of both countries.** Such a vision would provide a means for the United States to engage India in a way that supports larger American strategic interests, such as stability in Asia, freedom of navigation in the northern Indian

Ocean, coalition arrangements in support of peace operations, and the prevention of further diffusion of weapons of mass destruction.²³

- **Encourage regional economic ties.** ASEAN could be a possible conduit for the establishment of economic free trade agreements (FTA) or other economic vehicles.

D.9. Indian Communications. India is improving the way in which it communicates across all mass-media spectrums. So much so that India has transformed some of their economies, largely due to the benefits of the information and communication technologies (ICT). As one of the fastest growing ICT markets in the world, it is becoming much easier to communicate with the more than one billion Indians (1,080,264,388 July 2005 estimate).

D.9.1. Television.

D.9.1.1. There are approximately 110 million (2006) television sets in India. Television service in India is available throughout the country. Broadcasting is a central government monopoly under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, but the only network system, Doordarshan (Door = Distant = Tele, Darshan == Vision), also known as TV1, accepts advertisements for some programs. Doordarshan, established in 1959 and a part of All India Radio until 1976, consists of one national network and seven regional networks. In 1992 there were sixty-three high-power television transmitters, 369 medium-power transmitters, seventy-six low-power transmitters, and twenty-three transponders. Regular satellite transmissions began in 1982 (the same year color transmission began).

D.9.1.2. Indian television viewers. By 1994 some 6 million people were receiving television broadcasts via satellite, and the number was expected to increase rapidly throughout the rest of the decade. Cable television was even more prolific, with an estimated 12 to 15 million subscribers in 1994.

D.9.1.3. Besides Doordarshan, Zee TV--an independent station broadcasting from Bombay since 1992--uses satellite transmissions. In fact, because Doordarshan is the only network that is permitted to broadcast television signals domestically, Zee TV and other entrepreneurs broadcast their Indian-made videotapes via foreign transmitters.

D.9.1.4. TV channels in India. Other networks joining the fray are Cable News Network (CNN--starting in 1990); Asia Television Network (1991); Hong Kong-based Star TV (1991); Jain TV, near Bombay (1994); EL TV, a spin-off of Zee TV in Bombay (1994); HTV, an affiliate of the Hindustan Times in New Delhi (1994); and Sun TV, a Tamil-language service in Madras (1994). In a communications breakthrough for Indian Television in July 1995, Doordarshan agreed, for a US\$1.5 million annual fee and 50 percent of advertising revenue when it exceeds US\$1.5 million, to allow CNN to broadcast twenty-four hours a day via an Indian satellite.

D.9.1.5. Indian television channel Doordarshan offers national, regional, and local service for Indian television viewers. The number of televisions in India sets increased from around 500,000 in 1976, to 9 million in early 1987, and to around 47 million in 1994;

increases are expected to continue at around 6 million sets per year. More than 75 percent of television sets in India were black and white models in 1992, but the proportion of color sets is increasing annually. Most television sets are produced in India. Source: Indian Television Data 1995.

D.9.2 Internet Users: 50,600,000 (December 2005). Source: Internet World Stats.

- Broadband Subscribers: Broadband in India is defined as 256Kbps and above by the government regulator. Total subscribers – 2 million (November 2006). Source: TRA.I
- Internet Service Providers (ISPs) & Hosts: 86,571 (2004). Source: CIA World Fact Book.

D.9.3. Radio. Radio broadcasting began in India in 1927, with two privately-owned transmitters at Mumbai and Calcutta. These were nationalized in 1930 and operated under the name “Indian Broadcasting Service” until 1936, when it was renamed All India Radio (AIR). Although officially renamed again to Akashwani in 1957, it is still popularly known as All India Radio. All India Radio is a division of Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India), an autonomous corporation of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. It is the sister service of Prasar Bharati’s Doordarshan, the national television broadcaster.²⁴

- Radio broadcast stations: 153 AM stations, 91 FM stations, and 68 shortwave (1998)
- Radios: 116 million (1997)

D.9.4. Newspapers. The 2006 National Readership Survey findings show the largest read local language newspapers to be Dainik Jagran (with 21.2 million readers) and Dainik Bhaskar (with 21.0 million readers), both published in Hindi. The Times of India is the most widely read English newspaper (7.4 million), followed by The Hindu (4.05 million), and Hindustan Times (3.85 million). Today the average urban adult spends 44 minutes per day reading dailies and magazines. The average reading time used to be 41 minutes.²⁵



Figure D3: Dainik Jagran (India)

Notes

1. Robert Litvak, *Regime Change* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007).
2. RAND, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001)*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB63/index1.html, 10 January 2007.
3. Joint Publication 3-13 *Information Operations*, (Joint Staff, 2006), paragraph 2c(2), II-3.
4. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, April 2004.
5. Broadcasting Board of Governors web site, <http://www.bbg.gov/>.
6. Associated Press, "Iranian Prez Describes Bush as Evil," 23 November 2006, <http://www.ibnlive.com/news/iranian-prez-describes-bush-as-evil/26828-2.html> (accessed 5 December 2006).
7. Internet World Statistics, "Iran, Internet Usage and Marketing Report," <http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm> (accessed 11 December 2006).
8. Pars Times, "Iranian Media," 2001-2006, <http://www.parstimes.com/IL5.html> (accessed 11 December 2006).
9. Mattes Savada, ed., *North Korea: A Country Study*, 4th edition, Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-81), 324.
10. Kim has consolidated his grip on the military slowly by promoting loyalists to key positions throughout the apparatus. He has promoted more than 1,200 general-grade officers on 15 occasions prior to April 2006. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, *North Korean Civil-Military Trends: Military-First Politics To A Point*, September 2006, vi.
11. Daniel A. Pinkston, "North Korea's Foreign Policy Towards the United States," *Strategic Insights*, Volume V, Issue 7 (September 2006), 3
12. The United States blacklisted BDA in September 2005, saying it suspected that \$24 million in North Korean accounts was linked to counterfeiting or money-laundering. The accounts have been frozen and other Asian banks have taken similar moves against the bank. Agence France Presse, *US-North Korea talks on financial sanctions in limbo*, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070103/wl_afp/nkoreaunuclear_070103163048, 3 January 2007.
13. Nathaniel Aden, *North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implications*, August 2006, 1.
14. Although clearly the DPRK is more a kin to totalitarianism or a dictatorship one could also describe their form of government as a fascist monarchy or a traditional dynastic Confucian society, with an overlay of Stalinism.
15. In response to the recent democratic "color" revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the Chinese government is taking action to prevent similar uprisings in its own country. Under new "counterrevolution" measures approved by President Hu Jintao, censorship of web sites, books, and blogs has increased. But non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have borne the brunt of the crackdown. The Chinese government views many of these organizations as fronts for a U.S. effort to push global democratization, and has stepped up raids on particularly active NGOs. The new restrictions have inspired little response from the world at large. Yet the crackdown, if successful, could be a serious step backwards for Chinese civil society. If the world wants a free and democratic China, writes Foreign Policy, it should pay more attention to the survival and growth of Chinese liberal institutions. Yale Global Online, *China's Color-Coded Crackdown*, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6376>, 3 January 2007.
16. Stephen Bradner, *North Korea's Strategy*, paper presented at the third Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)/Institute for National Security Studies/Army War College-sponsored Workshop on Competitive Strategies, held 12-14 June 2000 in Arlington, Virginia. Posted on the web at <http://www.wizard.net/~npec/papers/Bradner.htm>.

17. Cheong Wa Dae, *Written Interview by President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea with Kompas of Indonesia*, http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/archive/archive_view.php?id=cb0bae9fd09c33d7e0957c1&m_def=3&ss_def=5&meta_id=for_your_info, 4 December 2006.
18. Russian News and Information Agency, "Russia Set To Develop Ties With North Korea Despite Nuke Problem," <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061229/58101445.html>, 29 December 2006.
19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2006*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2006/index.html>, 5 January 2007.
20. RAND, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001)*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB63/index1.html, 10 January 2007.
21. BBC, "Bush Signs US-India Nuclear Bill," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6189467.stm, 10 January 2007.
22. U.S.-India relations during the Cold War can be characterized as tenuous and untrusting. India, who practiced an "independent" foreign policy, seemed to favor the Soviet Union and often times seemed biased against the U.S.
23. RAND, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001)*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB63/index1.html, 10 January 2007.
24. Bookrags, "Culture of India," http://www.bookrags.com/Culture_of_India#Radio, 12 January 2007.
25. The Hindu, "Dailies add 12.6 million readers: NRS," <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holnus/001200608291820.htm>, 12 January 2007.